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State, Be Not Proud:  A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death 
Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty
Dan Markel
In the aftermath of Governor Ryan’s decision in 2003 to commute the 
sentences of each offender on Illinois’ death row, various scholars have claimed 
that Ryan’s action was cruel, callous, a “grave injustice,” and, from a 
retributivist perspective, “an unmitigated moral disaster.”  This Article contests 
that position, showing not only why a commutation of death row is permitted 
under principles of retributive justice, but also why it might be required.  When 
properly understood, retributive justice, in its commitment to moral 
accountability and equal liberty, hinges on modesty and dignity in modes of 
punishment.  In this vein, retributivism opposes the apparently ineluctable slide 
towards ever-harsher punishments in the name of justice.  While the thesis I 
defend is sited in the particular context of the death penalty, the implications 
reach more broadly; the argument offered here signals that a commitment to 
retributivism in no way impedes the realization of humane institutions of 
criminal justice and a rejection of the benighted, misbegotten, and often brutal 
status quo we shamefully permit to endure.
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I. Introduction
In early 2003, one of the biggest stories in the history of American 
criminal justice erupted.  After it became clear that Illinois’ criminal justice 
system had erroneously sentenced more inmates to death than it had actually 
executed, then-Governor George Ryan decided on the eve of his departure from 
office to do what few other executive branch officials have ever done in so 
dramatic a way--he cleared out death row.1  By commuting the sentences of 
virtually each death row prisoner in Illinois to life imprisonment,2 Ryan set off a 
firestorm of reactions.3  Throngs of citizens and politicians denounced Governor 
Ryan’s action as that of a rogue executive, calling it lawless, unjust, and 
immoral.4  Many viewed the move as a cynical distraction from Ryan’s own 
troubles with the law.5  Others saw him as courageous, merciful, and even 
heroic.6
Ryan’s decision has instigated some scholarly discussion,7 though 
1
 Historically, several other governors have issued commutations of death row in America. In 
1915, Governor Lee Cruce of Oklahoma pardoned twenty-two offenders as he left office.  Fifty-
five years later, Governor Winthrop Rockefeller commuted the sentences of fifteen offenders in 
Arkansas.  Governor Toney Anaya commuted the death sentences of each of the five offenders 
on death row in New Mexico in 1986.  Ohio Governor Richard Celeste extended clemency to 
eight offenders in 1991, but there were others on death row who stayed there.  See Beau Breslin 
& John J. P. Howley, Defending the Politics of Clemency, 81 OR. L. REV. 231, 237 (2002); 
David A. Wallace, Dead Men Walking — An Abuse of Executive Clemency in Illinois, 29 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 379, 381 (2004).
2
 To be precise, Governor Ryan commuted three prisoners’ sentences to forty years and 164 to 
life without parole.  He also pardoned several offenders whom he believed were erroneously 
convicted.  Stephen P. Garvey, Is it Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution, Atonement, 
and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1319 n.1 (2004).  Notwithstanding these important pardons, I 
will nonetheless refer constantly throughout the piece to Governor Ryan’s action here as a 
“blanket commutation.”
3 See generally David Firestone, Absolutely, Positively for Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 2003, Week in Review, at 5 (discussing the political uproar over the pardons); John 
McCarron, New Era Trips Up Good Ol’ George, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2003, at 21 (“How to 
remember George Ryan? Was he St. George, who had the courage to slay our state’s dragon of a 
death-penalty system? Or a latter-day Lucifer, who sold his previous office to gain the 
gov ernor’s mansion . . . only to lose the respect of history.”).
4 See, e.g., Brian D. Crecente, Owens Blasts Death Row Move on TV, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 
14, 2003, at 3A (quoting Colorado Governor Bill Owens’s characterization of the commutation 
as “an abuse of power”); Firestone, supra note 3 (reporting Senator Joseph Lieberman’s 
characterization of the commutation as “shockingly wrong. . . . It did terrible damage to the 
credibility of our system of justice, and particularly for the victims.  It was obviously not a case-
by- case review, and that’s what our system is all about.”); Ryan Has Right on His Side, But He’s 
About To Go Horribly Wrong, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 29; Cal Thomas, Departing 
Governor Flat-Out Wrong on Capital Punishment, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2003, at 
15A (“Ryan’s decision is the type of decree usually associated with dictators.”); George F. Will, 
Unhealable Wounds, WASH. POST., Jan. 19, 2003, at B7 (attributing to Governor Ryan a 
“cavalier laceration of the unhealable wounds of those who mourn the victims of the killers the 
state of Illinois condemned”). 
5 Ryan was indicted in a “bribes-for-licenses” scandal after he left office but allegations of 
corruption swirled around him during his last days in office.  See Ex-Illinois governor Ryan 
indicted, CNN.COM, Dec. 17, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/17/ryan.ap. 
6 See, e.g., Marie Cocco, Hastert Can Help Cut Death Penalty Errors, NEWSDAY, Jan. 16, 2003, 
at A35 (calling Governor Ryan “an unlikely oracle of moral wisdom”); Rod Dreher, Gov. Ryan 
Did the Right Thing, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (January, Jan. 13, 2003), at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/dreher/dreher011303.asp (“Ryan might be headed for prison 
himself– he’s leaving office today, and is under criminal investigation for possible corruption; 
but he did the right thing here.”); Nobel Matchup: Bono vs. Ryan, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 2003, §5 
at 1 (“measur[ing] up” 2003 Nobel Peace Prize nominees Bono and Governor Ryan); William 
Raspberry, Mugged by the Reality of Injustice, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2003, at A23 (“Add the 
name of George Ryan to my short, short list of political heroes.”); The Ryan Campaign, STOP 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT NOW!, at http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/ryan.html (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2005) (advocating that Gov. Ryan receive the Nobel Peace Prize); cf. Mary Laney, Time 
To Change Our Thinking on Capital Punishment, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at 15 
(describing Governor Ryan’s earlier moratorium on the death penalty as a “brave and just 
thing”).
7 See, e.g., A Colloquium on the Jurisprudence of Mercy: Capital Punishment and Clemency, 82 
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surprisingly, not much of that discussion has critically analyzed whether Ryan’s 
action was legitimate or appropriate.  There are some notable exceptions.8
Professor Stephen Garvey, for instance, has argued that although the blanket 
commutation is defensible because it preserves the (admittedly remote) 
possibility of reconciliation between offender and survivors,9 it is nonetheless 
impossible to defend Ryan on retributivist grounds.  He writes that “[f]or the 
devout retributivist, the mass commutation of death row is an unmitigated moral 
disaster.”10  Professor Robert Blecker, a retributivist advocate of the death 
penalty, went even further than Garvey, stating that the commutation, “[a]bove 
and beyond its cruelty and callousness, . . . was a morally indiscriminate act.”11
Similarly, another scholar has called Ryan’s blanket commutation a “grave 
injustice.”12
The point of this Article is to contest that position and to explain why a 
retributivist not only can but should accommodate the blanket commu tation.  
This thesis entails two important consequences.  First, and most simply and 
importantly, a retributivist defense of Ryan’s commutation of death row augurs 
a retributivist critique of the death penalty itself.
Second, by exposing a retributivist embrace of both commutation and 
abolition, one helps alleviate the cramped interpretation of retributive justice 
that prevails in legal and scholarly discourse.  Countless cases in the Supreme 
Court equate retributivism with revenge or the desire to make criminals suffer or 
both.13  Equally dispiriting, various commentators reflexively embrace this view, 
especially when trying to characterize their retributivist interlocutors.14  This, I 
N.C. L. REV. 1279 (2004); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George 
Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004); 
Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415, 1421 (2004).
8 But see Robert Blecker, The Death Penalty: Where Are We Now? 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
295, 303 (2003); Garvey, supra note 2; Wallace, supra note 1, at 379.  Sarat & Hussain’s piece, 
supra note 7, however, takes pains to call Ryan’s actions “neither bold nor lawless” in light of 
the executive clemency power, but they do not undertake an extended philosophical critique of 
Ryan’s actions or his critics.  They instead situate clemency within a cultural practice of “legally 
sanctioned alegality.”  Sarat & Hussein, supra note 1, at 1311 - 12.  
9
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1341. 
10 Id. (emphasis added).  According to Garvey, “retributive justice obligates the state to punish 
an offender because and to the extent, but only to the extent, that he deserves to be punished. 
The punishment an offender deserves is in turn usually thought to be some function of his 
culpability or of his culpability combined with the harm he has caused. Either way, the state 
cannot shirk its obligation to do justice.”  Garvey, supra note 2, at 1324 (citation omitted).  
11
 Blecker, supra note 8, at 303.   
12
 Wallace, supra note 1 at 379.
13 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(“Punishment as retribution has been condemned by scholars for centuries, and the Eighth 
Amendment itself was adopted to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with 
vengeance.”) (footnote omitted); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 189 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“To my mind that would be ‘punishment’ in the purest sense; it would 
be naked vengeance.  Such an exaction of retribution would not lose that quality because it was 
undertaken to maintain morale.”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“But I cannot see that this [punishment] is anything other than forcing retribution 
from the offender--naked vengeance.”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) 
(identifying retribution with “retaliation and vengeance”); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 
(1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[A]n uncurbed spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in 
formal legal procedure for purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more 
lasting harm than all of the atrocities giving rise to that spirit.”). 
14 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 - 5 (1990) (observing that from the perspective of utilitarian theorists, 
retribution is an “unscientific indulgence of revenge”); Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in 
Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 971 - 73 (2000) (arguing that non-criminal wrongs 
warrant some degree of suffering); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal 
Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1892 (1991) (“Retributive punishment thus is both an emotional 
expression of disgust and an exacting of commensurate revenge that is meant to satisfy moral 
notions about just deserts.”); Andrew Oldequist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 335, 340 (2003) (“We do not take the revenge out of judicial retribution--that 
cannot be done--but circumscribing and institutionalizing vengeance turns it into a moral 
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argue, is far too shallow and misleading an account of the meaning of retributive 
justice.
Properly understood, retributive justice explains, with reference to the 
political ideals undergirding a liberal democracy, why we punish mentally 
competent offenders for their crimes--as opposed to “treat” them or ignore them 
in search of cheaper measures of harm-reduction.  Retributive justice is thus 
understood as the good achieved by the use of the state’s coercive power to 
communicate certain ideals to an offender convincingly determined to have 
breached a legitimate legal norm.  The social project of retributive justice 
possesses a good that has its own internal intelligibility and attractiveness, 
independent of what consequences follow.15  This view casts retributive justice 
in a more generous light, reducing the perception that it is part of a ceaseless 
quest to impose more and harsher punishment in the name of criminal justice.  
Thus, my task of defending the commutation of death row constitutes a chapter 
in a larger, unfolding project in which the public, the legislatures, the courts, and 
the academy come to appreciate the human face of retributive punishment and 
those who endorse it.16
Unfortunately, the antagonists to this enterprise are determined and 
many.17  But for many of these critics, their anxiety about retributivist theory is 
born of a virtual non-sequitur--for it is their position that a retributivist who 
gives a justification for why we have institutions of punishment also instructs 
society how much to punish and what to punish.18  But the why punish question 
category.  Justice is the blood descendant of vengeance.”); id. at 343 (“Our retributive urges may 
be as universal and as demanding as the sexual urge, but they are also as emotional and non-
rational as the sexual urge.”); Edward Rubin, Just Say No To Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
17, 41 (2003) (stating that philosophical arguments distinguishing retribution and revenge are 
likely to be ineffective because, in the public realm, “[t]he term retribution smolders with the 
spirit of revenge”); Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, 123 FIRST THINGS 17, 19 - 20 
(2002) (discussing “the authority of a government to exact vengeance”).  This tide is partly due 
to the famous influence of James Fitzjames Stephen’s writings in the nineteenth century.  See
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 152 (R. J. White ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1967) (1873) (“[T]he feeling of hatred and the desire of vengeance . . . are important 
elements of human nature which ought in such cases to be satisfied in a regular public and legal 
manner.”); J.F. STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (London, 
McMillan 1983) (1863) (“The criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same 
relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 41 - 42 (Dover 1991) (1881) (“If people would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the 
law, if the law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus 
avoid the greater evil of private retribution.”).
15
 I explicate further the meaning of this idea, and in particular the justifications for its practice, 
in Part III.  I should add here that pointing out a project’s internal intelligibility and 
attractiveness does not itself obligate the fulfillment of the social project under all instances and 
circumstances. 
16
 Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (2004) [hereinafter Markel, Against 
Mercy]; Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the 
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) [hereinafter 
Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?]; Dan Markel, The Justice of 
Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389 
(1999) [hereinafter Markel, The Justice of Amnesty?].
17 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 294 - 317 (2002) 
(criticizing retributive thought); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) [hereinafter WHITMAN, 
HARSH JUSTICE]; David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623 
(1992); Rubin, supra note 14, at 20 - 21 (calling retributivism “conceptually incoherent, 
inconsistent with our basic theory of government” and responsible for “wildly disproportionate 
sentences and the uncontrolled expansion of the prison population”); Russ Shafer-Landau, The 
Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUDIES 289 (1996); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against 
Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (2003) [hereinafter Whitman, A Plea Against 
Retributivism].
18 See, e.g., Dolinko, Whitman, Shafer-Landau, supra note 17; Rubin, supra note 14.  To be sure, 
both Whitman and Dolinko recognize the difference between retributivist philosophers and the 
discourse of retribution in contemporary politics, but both tend to view the former as having a 
direct and malignant influence on the latter.  See also David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About 
Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 559 (1991) (stating that retributivism as a theory “bolster[s] 
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is distinct from the how much to punish question and there is no retributivist 
doctrine that states we should punish as much and as harshly as we seem to be 
doing in America today.  This confusion arises because too often retributivists 
are viewed as adherents to lex talionis,19 which is often thought of as 
punishment in kind--a principle crudely associated with the Biblical phrase an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.20  But to the extent lex talionis is a principle,21
it is a sentencing principle of how and how much to punish someone, not a 
retributivist principle that answers why we punish.22  To be sure, there is some 
relationship between the questions why we punish and how much we punish and 
in what manner.  Indeed, it would be hard to critique the death penalty from a 
retributivist perspective if it were otherwise.  But to insist, as many critics do,23
that retributivism must provide a comprehensive answer to what conduct should 
be prohibited and how much punishment should be imposed is mistaken.  
Instead, I argue that the relationship between the justification of punishment and 
the kind and amount of punishment is confined to a limited inquiry: whether our 
chosen means and quanta of punishment offend or comply with the animating 
reasons for why we punish, and whether the method used to punish has sufficed 
to discharge the prima facie duty to punish.  In other words, the nature of the 
justification for punishment may constrain the range of responses a state may 
apply to a criminal, but it does not determine the sentencing outcome.  
 This Article tries to make sense of that limited relationship in the 
context of the death penalty.  The argument thus unfolds in four parts.  First, in 
Part II, I provide an overview of the criticisms of Governor Ryan’s action.  
Specifically, I look at four kinds of allegations against Ryan’s action: first, it 
constituted an unlawful anti-democratic abuse of power; second, it was a 
wrongful reliance on mercy; third, it demonstrated a callous derogation of the 
interests and desires of victims and their survivors; and finally, Ryan’s action 
blithely disregarded the offenders’ moral desert of capital punishment on 
account of their heinous crimes.24
capital punishment and . . . encourage[s] an increasing reliance on imprisonment.”); Richard O. 
Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for Capital 
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177 (1981) (characterizing retributivists as pro-death penalty).
19 E.g., Rubin, supra note 14, at 28 (contending that retribution, understood as the notion “that 
the criminal should be paid back for harm he did . . . inevitably suggests the famous lex 
talionis”); Shafer-Landau, supra note 17, at 299 (“The classic accompaniment to retributivism is 
lex talionis.  Lex requires imposing a harm on a criminal identical to the one he imposed on his 
victim.”).
20 See Numbers 35:31; Exodus 21:23 - 25 (“And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life 
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for 
wound, stripe for stripe.”); Leviticus 24:17 - 20 (“And he that killeth any man shall surely be put 
to death. . . . And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour; as he hath done, so shall it be done 
to him.  Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . . .”).  See also HAMMURABI’S LAWS
109 (M.E.J. Richardson trans., Sheffield Accademic Press 2000) (“If a builder has built a house 
for a man and has not made his work strong enough and the house he has made has collapsed 
and caused the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be killed.  If it has caused the 
death of the son of the owner of the house, they shall kill that builder’s son.”).
21
 As Blackstone famously observed “there are very many crimes, that will in no shape admit of 
[lex talionis] penalties, without manifest absurdity and wickedness.  Theft cannot be punished by 
theft, defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery, and the like.” 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *13.  Jeremy Waldron has written the most 
sophisticated piece I have seen on lex talionis.  See Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 25 (1992).  There, Waldron deftly shows that lex talionis does not require inflicting the 
same exact treatment on the offender that the offender inflicted on his victim.  Rather, Waldron 
argues, it requires the imposition of a relevantly similar deprivation.  He concludes that lex 
talionis is neither necessarily tied to retribution nor to execution for murderers.  Id. at 25 - 27.
22
 For an example of an attempt to provide a retribuivism-inspired theory of the criminal law, 
see, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 88 
(1997).
23
 E.g., Shafer-Landau, supra note 17, at 289.
24
 Of course, these concerns might arise for someone who does not identify as a retributivist, but 
I think these four concerns are predictable reactions from people who might identify with a 
retributivist perspective, at least under popular conceptions of what it means to be a retributivist.   
07/01/05 1:45 PM Page 7
Part III furnishes an account of retributive justice that is capable of 
illuminating its compatibility with a blanket commutation of death row.  The 
account of punishment I offer there is called the Confrontational Conception of 
Retribution, or CCR.  The CCR shows how the practice of punishment is 
internally intelligible because it instantiates the ideals of moral responsibility, 
equal liberty under law, and democratic self-defense.  I should mention here that 
although my approach to retributive justice shares some core similarities with 
prior retributivist accounts, it differs from those accounts too, and thereby 
avoids some of the challenges brought by retributivism’s recent critics.25  For 
example, my approach does not rely on, and indeed rejects, “retributive hatred,” 
a notion developed by Jeffrie Murphy in Forgiveness and Mercy.26  Nor is it 
based on anger,27 resentment,28 or vengeance.29  Nor does it rely upon the “root 
idea or metaphor . . . that transgression creates an imbalance that must be 
restored by the like suffering or privation of the wrongdoer.”30  Rather, the CCR 
is an attempt to locate retributive justice in the ideals of a rule-of-law-guided 
liberal democracy.  Thus, to the extent that the account I offer is coherent and 
attractive, it frustrates the criticism that punishment qua retribution is merely a 
current manifestation of some atavistic or primitive impulse.31  Instead, we can 
show that it is bound up with our best understanding of how individuals and 
communities live well together.
Drawing on this account, I show in Part IV that retributive justice does 
justify a blanket commutation of death row.  Specifically, the first, and most 
familiar, reason against executions centers on the concern for accuracy in meting 
25
 I have in mind the recent attacks against retributivism found in Russell L. Christopher, 
Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2002); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1225 - 1303 
(2001); Rubin, supra note 14.  See also Dolinko, supra note 17; Whitman, supra note 17. 
26 Jeffrie Murphy, Hatred: A Qualified Defense, in JEFFRIE MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, 
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 88 (1988).
27 WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY 152 - 154 (1979) (exalting anger as “the passion that recognizes and cares about 
justice” because anger, which is central to retribution, “recognizes that only men have the 
capacity to be moral beings and, in doing so, acknowledges the dignity of human beings”); see
also PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE (2001); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING 
EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 17 - 26 (2003) (giving “two cheers for vindictiveness”); 
Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in THE 
PASSIONS OF LAW 123 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999); cf. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of 
Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 210 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Where is that compassionate concern for others that is outraged because 
another person could have so unnecessarily caused such suffering?”); Roger Wertheimer, 
Understanding Retribution, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1983, at 19, 23 (observing that 
“wrongdoing can give us a right . . . to be angry” and “justify feelings of resentment, 
indignation, outrage, remorse, guilt, and the like”).
28
 For the best discussion of punishment arising from resentment, or ressentiment, see FRIEDRICH 
WILHELM NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS Ch. 11 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. 
Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1887).
29
 For a defense of vengeance, see ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMOTIONS 
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 41 (1990).  Id. at 41 (“[Vengeance] is . . . a primal 
sense of the moral self and its boundaries.  By denying the reality or the legitimacy of vengeance 
we deny this sense of the moral self and moralize away those boundaries of the self without 
which it makes no sense to talk about dignity or integrity . . . .  Not to feel vengeance may 
therefore be not a sign of virtue but a symptom of callousness and withdrawal . . . .”); see also
FRENCH, supra note 27; Solomon, supra note 27.  A more muted endorsement of revenge can be 
found in William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s Theory of Revenge, 
in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 161 - 202 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
30
 Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1511 (2000).
31
 I recognize of course that emotions are not always or simply impulses devoid of cognitive 
content.  See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE 
OF EMOTIONS (2003) (arguing that emotions are forms of evaluative thought that encompass 
value judgments of the significance of things and persons in our moral lives).  Nonetheless, I 
prefer to couch my account of retributive punishment in terms of relatively emotionally neutral 
political ideals, as described in greater detail in Part III.
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out a punishment that forecloses error-correction.  This argument rests upon a 
familiar retributive anxiety of avoiding the punishment of the innocent.  Second, 
retributivism as a political account of punishment is understandably opposed to 
the distribution of a penalty imposed on the basis of morally arbitrary facts such 
as race of victim or intra-state geography.  Because Ryan could easily 
demonstrate that certain offenders were being arbitrarily sentenced to death row, 
he was permitted to question how the institutions of criminal justice caused such 
systematic failures.  In other words, although the culpability of an offender is
decided case-by- case, he is still entitled to a system that determines such 
culpability accurately and fairly.32  Even “if all 171 Illinois death row inmates 
were, in fact guilty, that did not mean that the broken system’s decision that they 
should die was one worthy of trust.”33
Although these reasons are substantial enough to permit a blanket 
commutation, they may seem insufficient on their own, at least compared to the 
available alternative of searching case-by-case review, to require a blanket 
commutation (or more generally the abolition of execution).  That’s because 
case-by- case review could arguably provide a more narrowly tailored solution to 
reduce if not eliminate these concerns of accuracy and equity in particular cases.  
I address that criticism at length and then in Part V, I explain how these various 
arguments, and others, impinge on and counsel against the imposition of the 
death penalty itself.  
The first of these arguments looks at how the death penalty forecloses 
the opportunity for an offender to internalize the moral ideals that animate 
retributive justice in the first place.  The second argument addresses why 
retributivism’s concerns for accurate and fair distribution of punishment require 
a posture of modesty in punishment, and why this posture of modesty crumbles 
in the face of state execution.  I then examine the relationship between 
retributive justice and human dignity and explain why that relationship ought to 
curtail any enthusiasm for capital punishment among retributivists. 
Taken together, these arguments indicate why a blanket commutation of 
death row was justified on retributivist grounds and why abolition of capital 
punishment is appropriate.  But prior to the conclusion, I also examine which 
arguments internal to the retributivist perspective adumbrated in Part III might 
counsel in favor of the death penalty.  Here I tease out the complexities 
associated with considerations of deterrence and how a retributivist outlook 
might be required, at least in theory, to accommodate some of those concerns.  I 
then consider the relevance of lex talionis and moral desert and how those 
factors affect the retributivist analysis of the death penalty.  
In sum, the principles of retributive justice, as interpreted and developed 
in this Article, offer a strong justification for Governor Ryan’s decision to 
commute death row.  They also strongly support, if not require, the abolition of 
the death penalty itself.  
Providing a retributivist defense for Governor Ryan’s actions speaks not 
only to moral truth (as I see it), but also to pragmatic politics.  My naive and 
audacious hope is that this retributivist reasoning may embolden executive 
office-holders to take the same actions Ryan did because they will be better able 
to explain their actions to a potentially skeptical or resistant public.  It may also 
help spur more legislative moratoria on the death penalty and more 
conversations about its proper place in a liberal democracy committed to 
securing the conditions for human flourishing.  In a climate in which politicians 
often have their fingers to the wind, and their ears to the mouths of their 
pollsters, it is vital that defenders of anti-death penalty positions have 
32 Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (halting death penalty usage because processes 
were constitutionally defective).
33 Lawrence Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
573, 579 (2004).
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retributivist arguments on which to rely.34  Although the argument here is not 
designed to create talking points for abolitionist agendas, I don’t want to pretend 
that the argument could not service such politics.  But my more immediate, 
albeit challenging, goal is to help realize the prospect of putting a human face on 
retributive punishment.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH A BLANKET COMMUTATION OF DEATH ROW?
As I mentioned in the Introduction, there are at least four criticisms one 
can make against a blanket commutation, each of which might be shared by 
people who self-identify as retributivist in outlook, although some of these 
criticisms would be made by people embracing different theories of punishment 
as well.  The first challenge is basically about legal authority--and it argues that 
the blanket commutation constituted an anti-democratic abuse of power that has 
the effect of undermining the credibility of the legal system.  The second 
argument contends that Ryan mistakenly relied on mercy in justifying his 
decision to issue a blanket commutation.  The third criticism of Ryan claims that 
a blanket commutation undermines the state’s commitment to the interests and 
well-being of victims and survivors.  Finally, the fourth argument contends that 
the blanket commutation was wrong because it precluded the opportunity for 
imposing upon offenders a punishment that they deserve due to the wickedness 
of their crimes.  Each of these criticisms is amplified below, and even more is 
said about each in Parts IV and V.
A. An Unlawful Abuse of Power
After Ryan announced his commutation of death row, Senator Joseph 
Lieberman called the commutations “an abuse of power” that was “shockingly 
wrong. . . . It did terrible damage to the credibility of our system of justice, and 
particularly for the victims.  It was obviously not a case-by- case review, and 
that’s what our system is all about.”35  Various Illinoisans echoed this view.  For 
example, Governor Blagojevich, Ryan’s successor, said “there is no one-size fits 
all approach to this.”36  Illinois State Senator William Haine went further, stating 
that by issuing a blanket commutation Ryan “may have irreparably injured the 
law itself.”37 I understand this critique as being friendly toward a blanket 
commutation if there had been a determination that each sentence contained 
some defect.  What was unacceptable, from this perspective, was Ryan’s 
conclusion that the sentences should be modified because they were all the 
product of a broken system that caused too many errors.
Related to this claim is the concern that a blanket commutation is 
“explicitly, even exuberantly, anti- democratic.”38  This argument can be 
understood in two ways.  First, the death penalty had the imprimatur of the state 
legislature, whose laws permitted the use of capital punishment.  By commuting 
34 See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 2, at 1330 (“Governors may find mercy as equity to be the most 
politically appealing and safe basis on which to grant clemency to a particular death-row inmate 
. . . .”); Daniel T. Kobil, How To Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 
219, 221 - 28 (2003).
35 Firestone, supra note 3 (reporting Senator Joseph Lieberman’s characterization of the 
commutation).    
36 Reactions to Death Row Commutations, CNN.COM, Jan. 12, 2003, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/01/12/deathrow.quotes.
37
 Steve Whitworth, Haine Enraged by Governor’s Move, TELEGRAPH (Alton, Ill.), Jan. 12, 
2003, at A1, available at http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/coverage/44.html.
38
 Will, supra note 4, at B7; see also Sarat & Hussain, supra note 7, at 1308 - 09 (listing 
criticisms of Ryan’s clemency, including the undermining of democracy and the undercutting of 
the law).
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all of the death sentences, Ryan subverted the popular sovereign will.  Professor 
Wallace, for instance, claims that Ryan abused his power because he “used the 
executive clemency power in a manner in which it was never intended to be 
used: to circumvent the legislative process” that decides “whether the state 
should have capital punishment.”39  Second, Ryan’s actions could be understood 
as anti-democratic because they usurped the power of the jury as a democratic 
voice in the system.40  Many, if not all, of the death sentences were predicated 
on a jury finding that capital punishment was warranted.  By thwarting the 
people’s will to execute, Ryan’s decision, for some, undermined the retributivist 
commitment to let institutions of popular self-government effectuate an 
appropriate punishment for each crime.
B. Improper Reliance upon Mercy
Commentators like Professor Stephen Garvey have said that, from a 
retributivist perspective, Ryan improperly relied on mercy to justify his 
decision.41  During the speech he gave to defend his decision, Ryan, quoting 
Abraham Lincoln, said, “‘I have always found that mercy bears richer fruits than 
strict justice.’  I can only hope . . . that will be so.”42  The idea of mercy bearing 
richer fruits than strict justice is an intriguing one in part because it is somewhat 
enigmatic.  Garvey claims that mercy can be understood in two ways from a 
retributivist perspective.43  First, for purposes of this discussion, the remission of 
punishment in mercy’s name can be understood (somewhat crudely) as an 
imperfect obligation, that is, as a virtue to be exercised from time to time on 
account of compassion for offenders who have some redeeming characteristic 
unrelated to the offender’s choice to commit the offense.”44  Alternatively, 
mercy can be understood as a remission of punishment in whole or in part due to 
an equitable consideration that addresses the offender’s culpability or desert.45
Garvey believes that Ryan’s action was incompatible with both conceptions of 
mercy and was therefore improper from a retributivist perspective.46  Let me 
elaborate.
1. Mercy as Imperfect Obligation
One way to view mercy is as a remission of punishment--in this case, the 
executive grant of clemency--to an offender based on compassion for some trait 
or action of the offender, such as his remorse during his period of incarceration 
or his prior heroism in battle.  I will, following Garvey, call this kind of 
compassion-based mercy “mercy as imperfect obligation.”  As Garvey explains, 
not everyone ought to benefit from this kind of mercy.  Rather, to be mercy-
39
 Wallace, supra note 1, at 392.
40 See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311 (2003) 
(arguing that juries’ voices should be regarded as an instrument of democratic will and given 
greater powers to sentence directly); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1776 (1999).
41
 Garvey, supra note 2. 
42
 George H. Ryan, Remarks at Northwestern University College of Law (Jan. 11, 2003) 
(transcript available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/news/spring03/ryanspeech.html and at 
http://www.cuadp.org/20030111ryan.html).
43
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1325.
44 Id. at 1330 - 31.
45 Id. at 1328 - 29.
46 Id. at 1335.  To be clear, Garvey does not endorse the retributivist critique he constructs of 
Ryan’s decision.  Rather, he argues that retributivist theories of mercy cannot justify Ryan’s 
actions, and then defends Ryan’s actions on the basis of his “punishment as atonement” thesis.  
Id. at 1335 - 38.
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eligible, an offender must possess some feature or have performed some deed of 
a redeeming nature.47  Moreover, according to Garvey and others, compassion-
based mercy is an imperfect obligation: it is an obligation we must undertake 
only from time to time and only for those offenders who are mercy-eligible.48
One should therefore not be merciful all the time and to every offender who is 
mercy-eligible.  To be sure, this conception of mercy does not encompass all the 
reasons one might extend mercy.49  Nonetheless, even when mercy is restricted 
by the conditions mentioned above, Garvey argues that Ryan cannot rely on this 
conception of mercy to justify his blanket commutation.
2. Mercy as Equity
An alternative way to understand the criticism of Ryan is to think of 
mercy as “equity.”  Mercy as equity is a remission of punishment, in part or in 
whole, that acts as a “remedial mechanism” to correct unjust results, such that it 
serves as “justice . . . unmediated by rules.”50  Mercy as equity may occur, for 
example, when the executive grants clemency to an offender because the law of 
rules has failed to produce the just result.51  The law of rules may not have 
reached the just result for one of two reasons: first, the rules themselves tend to 
be either over-inclusive or under-inclusive, and thus cannot account for the 
unique aspects of a particular crime and/or a particular offender.  Alternatively, 
the rules were not followed properly, such as when a prosecutor fails to turn 
over exculpatory material to the defense,52 and that becomes known, say, only 
after all direct and collateral avenues of judicial review have been exhausted.  In 
both cases, mercy as equity is desirable, according to Garvey, because it 
remedies the apparent injustice caused by both rule-following and rule-
flouting.53  For Garvey, the tension between mercy and retributive justice is 
dissolved when mercy is understood as equity.54
3. The Implications of Mercy for a Blanket Commutation
With these two definitions of mercy in mind, let me at the outset concede 
that to the extent Ryan justified his actions by relying on the discourse of mercy 
as an imperfect obligation, this constituted an improper use of mercy from a 
retributivist perspective.  Ryan’s decision should not be defended on the grounds 
that mercy is an imperfect obligation.   First, it is doubtful that such mercy is 
conceptually part of the retributivist worldview in the realm of criminal law.55
47 Id. at 1331.
48 Id.; George Rainbolt, Mercy: In Defense of Caprice, 31 NOÙS 226, 226-241 (1997); George 
Rainbolt, Mercy, Justice and the Death Penalty (May 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author).
49
 For example, some sovereigns extend mercy to some or all offenders when the Christmas 
season or Bastille Day approaches.  See WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 93.
50
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1328.
51 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 
1175 - 76 (1989).
52
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1326.
53 Id. at 1326 - 28.
54 Id. at 1328 (“[M]ercy’s dilemma disappears.”).  In an earlier work, Garvey noted the problem 
of “treating mercy as if it were simply a species of equity” because doing so “erroneously 
reduces mercy to justice.  Individualization alone . . . is an inadequate account of mercy.”  
Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1041 (1996).
55
 Mercy as imperfect obligation is problematic for the reasons set out in, among other places, 
Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 16.  In that piece I tried to show how the unreviewable sites 
for mercy that exist within our constitutional structure pose fundamental threats to an underlying 
commitment to equal liberty under law, thus undermining not only retributivist notions of 
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Second, even if mercy as an imperfect obligation were something retributivists 
could accommodate, as Professor Garvey suggests, the blanket commutation by 
Ryan would be improper for the two reasons Garvey outlines.  First, the blanket 
commutation fails to determine whether an offender is mercy-eligible, i.e., that 
there was some contrition or heroism or other countervailing feature of the 
offender that warranted compassion-based mercy.56  Sec ond, the blanket 
commutation causes too much mercy, and therefore too little justice.57  For this 
second argument to work, one has to accept Garvey’s claim that mercy as a 
virtue is to be practiced only from time to time, because it inherently creates 
friction with notions of equality and justice.  If that premise is granted, the 
blanket commutation is wrong because it erodes the idea that mercy as imperfect 
obligation should be extended only from time to time and not to all people on 
death row.58
The more challenging question, of course, is whether mercy as equity 
could justify a blanket commutation of death row.  Ryan defended his action by 
claiming that the “capital system is haunted by the demon of error--error in 
determining guilt, and error in determining who among the guilty deserves to 
die.”59 Garvey says this global grant of clemency is wrong because it “extends 
to everyone on death row, not just to those who can credibly claim to have been 
victims of some injustice.”60  This argument, like Professor Blecker’s claim that 
the commutation was “morally indiscriminate,” tracks Senator Lieberman’s 
complaint that the blanket commutation by Ryan was an “abuse of power” that 
damaged the credibility of our system of justice because such a blanket 
commutation offends the notion of case-by- case review.  Garvey concluded that 
mercy as equity cannot justify blanket commutations of death row from a 
retributive perspective, and that instead, to justify the blanket commutation, one 
should turn to his theory of punishment as atonement.61  In this Article, I am not 
especially interested in challenging Garvey’s defense of the commutation in 
justice, but also liberal ones.  As a result, I criticized mercy in the public sphere of criminal law, 
though I also recognized its potential as a separate moral good in the private realm.  I offer a 
more detailed critique of Garvey’s particular analysis in Dan Markel, Prof. Garvey on Mercy 
and Retribution: A Comment (April 30, 2005)(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
56
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1331.
57 Id. at 1334.
58
 Parenthetically, one could imagine framing the blanket commutation of death row as 
consistent with the “only from time to time” restriction of the imperfect obligation of mercy.  If 
offenders on death row are viewed as merely one site among many in which mercy as an 
imperfect obligation can be extended, then Ryan did not extend a blanket commutation to all 
prisoners, but rather just to those on death row.  However, even if reframing Ryan’s action this 
way were acceptable, Garvey would still disagree with the blanket commutation because there 
was no prior determination that someone was mercy-eligible.  
59
 Ryan, supra note 42.
60
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1329.
61 Id. at 1341.  As a result of his rejection of retributive notions of mercy, Garvey refers us to his 
theory of “punishment as atonement,” according to which theory the blanket commutation is 
justified because it preserves the possibility of reconciliation between offender and victim or 
survivor.  For Garvey, this is significant because he places the possibility of reconciliation and 
right-relation between offender and victim at the heart of his theory of “punishment as 
atonement.”  See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1801 (1999).  Although Garvey doesn’t explicitly embrace the language of restorative justice, 
his theory of punishment as atonement shares some similar commitments about the kind of 
relationship between offender and victim that punishment should strive to cultivate.  On right-
relation and restorative justice generally, as well as a powerful critique thereof, see ANNALISE 
ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION: A CRITIQUE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2004). See also
Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1; Erik 
Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 205, 227 - 302; Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of 
Retributivism in Recovering States, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 389 (1999); Paul Robinson, The Virtues 
of Restorative Processes, The Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375; Robert 
Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Dangers of “Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343 
(commenting on the “danger” the restorative justice movement poses).
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terms of atonement, although it does raise interesting questions.62  Rather the 
ambition of the Article, at least in part, is to explain why Garvey’s predicate--
that the language and ideas of retributive justice must be abandoned to justify 
Ryan’s action--is mistaken.
C. The Significance of Victim Interests
The next criticism of Governor Ryan to consider is that his blanket 
commutation made a “mockery of murder victims”63 and impinged on the rights 
or interests of victims and their survivors.64  Richard Devine, the Cook County 
State’s Attorney, characterized Ryan’s action as “stunningly disrespectful to the 
hundreds of families who lost their loved ones to these Death Row murderers.”65
Ryan, according to Devine, “ripped open the emotional scabs of these grieving 
families.”66  This language soon became familiar.  George Will wrote that 
Ryan’s actions constituted a “cavalier laceration of the unhealable wounds of 
those who mourn the victims of the killers the state of Illinois condemned.”67
On this view, the wounds of victims and their survivors are so stark, their 
anguish so palpable, that there is no place to question the use of the death 
penalty.  For example, after Ryan had begun hearings on the use of clemency to 
fix the death penalty, one of the Chicago newspapers published an editorial 
urging the end of the hearings: the “agony [apparent from the victims’ 
testimony] does not by itself certify a convict’s guilt, but it does reiterate why 
Illinois citizens, through their elected representatives, have enacted and 
sustained capital punishment.”68
Austin Sarat describes this phenomenon more generally: “The desire to 
experience a direct, immediate, passionate connection to the suffering of the 
criminal fuels the victims’ rights movement.  Only when victims become agents 
in the suffering of the people responsible for their own suffering is a kind of 
social equilibrium reached.”69  Similarly, William Ian Miller argues that “[t]he 
notion of paying back . . . makes no sense unless the victim or his representative 
is there to hit back.  Under this paradigm . . . [t]he focus is . . . [on the victim’s] 
obligation to repay the wrong done to him by retaliating against either the 
wrongdoer or someone closely connected to him.” 70  According to this view, 
62
 I note only that the “punishment as atonement” thesis must somehow deny the relative 
significance of Garvey’s statement that “surely some [offenders] deserve the sentence they 
received, if anyone ever does.”  Garvey, supra note 2, at 1329.  If we understand Garvey to be 
saying that the death penalty can be deserved, he has to explain how it is preferable to place 
atonement and the reconciliation of offender and surviving family above desert.  (There is also a 
separate question regarding whether an offender can achieve a measurable amount of atonement 
and reconciliation while the offender is on death row awaiting execution.)  By contrast, Garvey’s 
careful phrasing may lend itself to the suggestion that no one ever deserves the death penalty.  
But if that were true, why would a retributivist committed to seeing “just deserts” oppose the 
commutation?   
63
 Sarat & Hussain, supra note 7, at 1309 (describing this criticism).
64 See Claire O’Brien, Ryan: Life over Death: Over Protests of Victims’ Families, Governor 
Commutes All Sentences, S. ILLINOISAN, Jan. 12, 2003, at 5A, available at
http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/coverage/45.html.
65
 Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 1.
66 Id.
67 See Will, supra note 4, at B7.
68 Editorial, Halt the Anguish, Gov. Ryan, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2002, at 8.
69
 Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: Victims, Retribution and George Ryan’s 
Clemency, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2004).
70
 William Ian Miller, Clint Eastwood and Equity: Popular Culture’s Theory of Revenge, in LAW 
IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE 161, 167 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998); see also
WENDY KAMINER, IT’S ALL THE RAGE: CRIME AND CULTURE 75 (1995) (“To a victim, the 
notion that crimes are committed against society, making the community the injured party, can 
seem both bizarre and insulting; it can make them feel invisible, unavenged, and unprotected.”); 
Iran Desert Vampire Executed, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4353449.stm (describing public execution of serial 
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then, by failing to hit back at the murderers with force similar to that used on the 
victims, the state “let the murderers off the hook.”71
D. Moral Desert and Capital Punishment
Finally, someone who supports the death penalty (at least for the serious 
crime of murder) may believe that the death penalty is what some murderers, 
i.e., the worst of the worst, deserve by dint of their wrongdoing.72  Deserved 
punishment lies at the center of virtually all theories of retribution.  Accordingly, 
courts and commentators commonly justify the death penalty in the language of 
retributive justice.73  One commentator has said that “[c]apital punishment 
hardly seems too harsh for someone who brutally murders a woman who is nine-
months pregnant and then cuts her unborn baby from her womb and then 
murderer in Iran involving slow strangulation, stabbing by family members of victims and 
repeated flogging). 
71 O’Brien, supra note 64, at 5A.
72 See generally WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY 144, 152, 154 (1979); Robert Blecker, The Death Penalty: Where Are We 
Now?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 295, 304 (2003) (describing “retributivist advocates” as 
“disgusted” by “abolitionists for their moral insensitivity”); Igor Primorac, On Capital 
Punishment, 17 ISR. L. REV. 133, 138 (1982) (arguing the death penalty is the proportionate 
penalty for murder); Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1662, 1669 (1986) (“[Execution] is . . . the only fitting retribution for murder I can think 
of.”); see also Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 301 (1982) (“The death penalty has always been considered a standard 
example of retributive justice; there is no other punishment that can be inflicted on a murderer 
that could possibly be proportionate to his crime.”) (citation omitted).
73
 This is a presumption articulated frequently (though wrongly, to my mind) by the Supreme 
Court.  See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2005) (“[T]here are two distinct social 
purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective 
offenders.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) 
(“We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably 
advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am convinced . . . that 
retribution provides the main justification for capital punishment ....”); Harris v. Alabama, 513 
U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (“[T]he interest that we have identified as the principal justification for the 
death penalty is retribution: ‘[C]apital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at 
particularly offensive conduct.’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (joint 
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (joint 
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (defining retribution as “an expression of the 
community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the 
only adequate response may be the penalty of death”); State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19, 25 (S.C. 
1992) (justifying the execution of a mentally ill offender because the “penological goal of 
retribution is served by this sentence”); see also Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and 
Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1151, 1156 (2003) (“Indeed, in the death penalty context, where discussions of retribution 
are prominent, the tendency to conflate retribution with other justifications for punishment, with 
which it has historically been associated, has generated considerable confusion.”); Carol Steiker 
& Jordan Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 335 (2003) (“The central 
justification for the death penalty in the modern era has been retribution.”).  
Interestingly, in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Brennan wrote 
that retribution is not the goal of the death penalty: “As the history of the punishment in this 
country shows, our society wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire to kill criminals simply to 
get even with them.”  408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring).  Chastising the States, 
he also wrote that “[a]lthough it is difficult to believe that any State today wishes to proclaim 
adherence to ‘naked vengeance,’ the States claim . . . that death is the only fit punishment for 
capital crimes and that this retributive purpose justifies its infliction.”  Id. at 304 (citations 
omitted).  As Mary Sigler correctly notes, Brennan’s claims are both factually and conceptually 
problematic.  Factually, there is little support for Brennan’s claim that the nation is not interested 
in vengeance.  “More importantly, it mistakenly characterizes retribution as a desire to ‘get 
even,’ a desire more properly associated with revenge.”  Sigler, supra, at 1179.  As explained 
below, revenge is a very different animal from retribution.  See infra text accompanying notes 
132 - 134.
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murders two-out-of-three of her children so that they can’t be witnesses against 
them.”74  Hence, according to family members and advocates for victims, by 
issuing a blanket commutation of the death row inmates Ryan “let murderers off 
the hook.”75
This critique finds its modern genesis in the work of Immanuel Kant.  
Kant advocated the death penalty for murderers and saw the duty to execute 
every last murderer, even as a society disbands, as a moral obligation.76  Kant--
in an all-too-familiar passage--wrote that even if “civil society were to be 
dissolved by the common consent of all its members (e.g., if a people inhabiting 
an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the world), the last 
murderer remaining would first have to be executed, so that each has done to 
him what his deeds deserve . . . .”77  The obligation to execute the murderer 
exists so that “blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted 
upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators 
in this public violation of justice.”78  That position would appear to counsel 
against any commutation to life imprisonment.79
Looking at these accusations, one can see how commuting all death 
sentences appears problematic from a retributivist perspective.  Ryan’s blanket 
commutation of death row appears to have been an improper extension of mercy 
that lacked support from both the representative democratic institutions as well 
as victims in large part because it ruptured the settled intuitions of many people 
that the appropriate punishment for murderers, or at least the worst of murderers, 
is execution.  Taken together, Ryan’s actions seem, at first glance, untenable as 
a matter of retributive justice.  The popular thirst for lex talionis, or striking back 
in kind at the offenders of these heinous crimes, is sometimes thought to be at 
the heart of retribution.  Indeed, as I suggested earlier, various Justices on the 
Supreme Court have reinforced this view on numerous occasions by lumping 
together retribution and naked vengeance.80  But what they are drawing on 
proves to be a faulty conception of what retribution is and what it does.  For that 
reason, I want now to explore in further detail what retributive justice is in its 
most attractive and plausible version so that Parts IV and V can demonstrate 
why these criticisms of Ryan’s actions are misplaced.
III. THE CONFRONTATIONAL CONCEPTION OF RETRIBUTION
Garvey provides a familiar, though problematic, description of 
retributive justice.  Drawing on traditional notions of retribution, Garvey 
explains that, 
74 Wallace, supra note 1, at 392. 
75 O’Brien, supra note 64, at 5A.
76 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 -43 (Mary Gregor trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
77 Id. at 142.
78 Id.  Views of a similar flavor can be found in BERNS, supra note 72, at 164 - 68, and Ernest 
van den Haag, supra note 72, at 1669 (“[Execution] is . . . the only fitting retribution for murder 
I can think of.”).
79
 Perhaps surprisingly, Kant is not always so categorical on the absolute duty to punish.  He 
writes that executive prerogative would allow the state to waive punishment of a criminal for 
crimes against the state, such as treason.  See, e.g., KANT, supra note 76, at 145.  And in his 
other writings, excluding the RECHTSLEHRE, or Part I of the METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, Kant 
shows an appreciation for deterrence.  See B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: 
Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151 (1989) (viewing Kant 
as a mixed theorist); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. 
L. REV. 509, 509, 513 (1987) (cataloguing these inconsistencies and arguing that Kant has 
authored not a theory of punishment, but a “random (and not entirely consistent) set of remarks--
some of them admittedly suggestive--about punishment”) (emphasis omitted).
80 See authorities cited supra note 13.
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[r]etributive justice obligates the state to punish an offender 
because and to the extent, but only to the extent, he 
deserves to be punished.  The punishment an offender 
deserves is usually thought to be some function of his 
culpability or of his culpability combined with the harm he 
has caused.  Either way, the state cannot shirk its obligation 
to do justice.81
One might fairly quibble with certain aspects of this description of retributive 
justice,82 but this description of retributive justice’s features is one that is well-
recognized.83  Underlying this standard description is the intui tion that imposing 
punishment for legal offenses is a self-evidently attractive obligation.84  Note, 
however, that it does not explain to a skeptic why one should embrace the 
project of pursuing retributive justice as a common social endeavor.
That’s because this standard account does not unpack the claim that an 
offender deserves to be punished: by virtue of what can it be said that he 
deserves this punishment?  Imagine offender Jack.  Not everyone will agree with 
the claim that the state should punish Jack because he committed some form of 
wrongdoing.85  Others may not even accept the basic claim that Jack deserves 
punishment.  Instead, they might advocate some form of rehabilitative 
“treatment.”86
There is a rich philosophical literature about the nature of desert.87  My 
sense is that moral desert is an inadequate starting point from which one should 
think about why institutions of punishment in liberal democracies should be 
created.88  As a result, I try to re-assess the idea of desert to explain why a 
person should be punished by the state for his or her criminal wrongdoing.  
What is it about Jack’s past offense that entails the state’s prima facie right and 
obligation to punish him?
In the past, retribution theorists asserted that “the fact that a person has 
committed a moral offence provides a sufficient reason for his being made to 
suffer.”89  This understanding of retribution as a purely interpersonal moral 
doctrine has waned over time, though it remains a vital trope in popular 
incarnations.90 Against this claim, one could reasonably argue that just because 
Jack committed wrongdoing does not permit Jill to punish him.91  But skeptics 
81
 Garvey, supra note 2, at 1324 (footnotes omitted).
82
 For example, some might argue that the obligation to punish is not absolute, but rather is one 
that is balanced against obligations of other social importance.
83
 Michael Moore, for example, has defined retributivism as the “view that punishment is 
justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it.”  Moore, supra note 27, at 179.  For 
Moore, moral culpability is the same as desert.  Id. at 181.
84
 Robert Blecker is one of the retributivists who relies on retributivist intuitionism.  See, e.g., 
Robert Blecker, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves Death?, 24 PACE 
L. REV. 107, 181 - 82 (2003) (asserting that “the ‘worst of the worst’ are real and can be known 
and that we can, and must, identify and execute them as soon as possible”).
85 See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 17, at 1627.
86 E.g., TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 81 - 89 (1969); Henry 
Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Rehabilitation, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 255, 255 -
61 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971).
87 See, e.g., Russ Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert, 81 PAC. PHIL. Q. 189, 189 n.1 (2000) 
(providing citations to the relevant philosophical literature).
88
 I say more about this literature in Dan Markel, Ex Ante Retributivism (April 30, 
2005)(manuscript on file with the author).  For a useful overview of the literature on desert, and 
an extensive bibliography on the topic, see Owen McLeod, Desert, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desert (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
89
 C.W.K. Mundle, Punishment and Desert, 4 PHIL. Q. 216, 221 (1954).
90
 Consider the academic defenders of revenge such as Robert Solomon and William Ian Miller.  
See sources cited supra note 29.  In popular culture, revenge movies are continually popular.  
See, e.g., IN THE BEDROOM (Miramax Films 2001); UNFAITHFUL (20th Century Fox Film Corp. 
2002); MONSTER’S BALL (Lions Gate Films 2001); KILL BILL: VOLUME I (Miramax Films 
2003); KILL BILL: VOLUME II (Miramax Films 2004). 
91
 Dolinko, supra note 17, at 1630; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 1233 n.668 
(“[I]t does not follow from the fact that the criminal acted wrongly--and, following Kant’s view, 
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of retribution have a harder time rebutting the claim that punishment is 
warranted when, in a liberal democracy, the state has outlawed certain behavior 
and the punishing institution is the state (not Jill).92  While that contention still 
needs to be defended (and I offer a defense below), it is less susceptible to the 
critique that skeptics like David Dolinko make against retributivism as a 
justification for the institutions of punishment. 
A. The Animating Principles of Retributive Justice
The account of punishment I offer, which I call the Confrontational 
Conception of Retribution, or CCR,93 does not rely on moral desert as the 
rationale for its justification.  Rather, it is fidelity to three other principles that 
have broader acceptance as specifically, though not necessarily only, political 
ideals: first, moral accountability for unlawful actions; second, equal liberty 
under law; and third, democratic self-defense.94  On this view, punishment is 
attractive because it effectuates certain ideals that are widely understood and 
embraced by citizens of complex liberal democracies such as ours.95
Conversely, when a liberal democracy fails to create credible institutions of 
criminal justice, it undermines our commitment to these principles, though not 
under all circumstances.
What’s important to see, however, is that the good achieved by 
punishment for an offense is not a contingent good, such as general deterrence.  
Rather, it is bound up in the practice of punishment itself, so that the practice of 
punishment has an internal good, and the achievement of that good makes the 
practice internally intelligible and attractive.96  Equally important, the account of 
retributive justice that I offer below explains why the state, rather than the 
victim or her allies, must be the agent imposing punishment. 
1. Moral Responsibility for Unlawful Behavior
thereby willed that his maxim be adopted universally—that the state acts rightly, rather than 
committing a further wrong, in imposing punishment.”). 
92 Cf. GEORGE SHER, DESERT 3 (1987) (stating that if wrongdoers deserve punishment “it is at 
least permissible for suitably situated persons to punish them”).  
93
 I explain why this is called the “confrontational” conception of retribution in Section E.Part 
III.C, infra.
94
 As revealed in the footnotes that follow, the work of Herb Morris, Jean Hampton, and Jeffrie 
Murphy has contributed substantially to the development of this account.  While the account 
offered here draws on their work, it differs in several significant respects, such as by 
emphasizing the political and institutional dimension to punishment and by expressly 
incorporating an ex ante viewpoint.  That said, it is not my intention here to explain in great 
detail where this account of retribution draws upon and departs from previous accounts.  I save 
that task for a separate project, Dan Markel, Ex Ante Retributivism, supra note 88.  Rather, I seek 
here to apply the account I have thus far developed to the question of Ryan’s commutation of 
death row, and to the death penalty more generally. 
95
 To be sure, our commitment to these principles is bound up in some sense with how we 
determine an offender’s culpability in particular cases.  Two criteria must be satisfied for these 
commitments to be credible: first, an insistence on mens rea and mental competence; and 
second, attention to whether the action was excused or justified under the particular 
circumstances.  Self-defense, duress, or necessity may have actuated the offense, or provocation 
may mitigate its severity.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02, 3.04 (1962).  Call these 
the culpability and context criteria, respectively. 
96
 Here I should note that my account doesn’t resolve the “infinite regress” problem because 
ultimately one could ask why one should embrace equal liberty under law, or moral 
responsibility, or democratic self-defense.  These ideals, I believe, are more deeply held than the 
view that desert is a self-executing concept, and thus I think it is a more successful strategy to 
explain the practice of retribution as partaking of those ideals, rather than of desert, which is 
more problematic.  
07/01/05 1:45 PM Page 18
Retribution for legal wrongdoing is justified in part because it expresses 
our belief in the dignity of the offender by treat ing him as a responsible moral 
agent and communicating that belief to him.97  When we credibly attempt to 
punish an offender who knows, or reasonably should have known, that it was 
illegal to have stolen, raped, or murdered, we are trying to tell him that his 
actions matter to this community constituted by shared laws.  To illustrate:  
imagine that I physically attacked my neighbor and that such attacks are illegal.  
If the state, in its ordinary course of business, knowingly did nothing in the face 
of my crime, its inaction could be read to express two social facts: first, an 
indifference to the legal rights of its citizens, particularly to the security of their 
persons and property; and second, a statement of condescension to me that my 
actions will not be taken seriously by the state.  When the state makes an effort 
to punish me for my crime, by contrast, it tells me that I will be held accountable 
for my unlawful actions.  In this way, the attempt at punishment communicates 
the ideal of moral accountability for unlawful actions.98  Punishment for a legal 
wrong is one of the ways society makes clear that one cannot disclaim 
responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of one’s actions, one 
of the core notions underlying retributive thought.  Put differently, punishment 
manifests our rejection of fatalism, the notion that some other force--God, stars, 
butterfly breeding patterns in Chile--control one’s conduct. 
On this view, retributive punishment is a communicative practice, not 
merely an expressive one.99  Effective communication to the offender is of 
fundamental importance to the practice of retribution.  The practice of 
retribution would itself not be intelligible, for example, if the offender could not 
understand the message that the state was sending.  The offender must be able to 
understand the communication, though he need not be persuaded by it.  He may 
proclaim his innocence notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary, but if he 
cannot understand on what grounds he is being punished, then the punishment is 
no punishment, but merely a festival of coercive deprivation visited upon the 
offender.
A thought experiment fleshes out this view.  Say the offender sometime 
after his crime unwittingly swallowed an amnesiac drug that erased his entire 
prior self-concept, such that he had no memory of the unlawful action, and 
indeed no memory of his personality-- would punishment make sense in this 
context?  On the view that I am developing, it would not.100  Relatedly, it would 
97
 I interchangeably use the words “responsible” and “accountable,” and by doing so I am 
referring chiefly to the notion that when an agent has performed (or refrained from) an act, he 
merits praise or blame.  Thus, when I say A is responsible (or accountable) for X, I do not mean 
that A caused X, nor do I mean that A is obligated to X.  I simply mean that A is subject to blame 
(in a legal sense) for X.
98
 Hence the claim from some quarters that the reluctance to punish offenders from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, who are nonetheless fully responsible moral agents, is “elitist and 
condescending” because “far from evincing fellow feeling and the allowing of others to 
participate in our moral life” such reluctance “excludes them as less than persons.”  Moore, 
supra note 27, at 215 - 16.
99
 By this distinction, I mean that the state has an interest in communicating a specific message 
to someone in particular; the expressivist has a larger audience in mind, and conceivably is 
indifferent to whether the expression reaches a particular person.  For example, when I call you 
at home to tell you “Dad is not coming home tonight,” that is a communication.  When I write a 
column in the newspaper, I am expressing my opinion.  Communication, as I use it, has a known 
and particularized target.  This differs slightly from the definition used by others.  Anderson and 
Pildes, for example, say that expression requires only the manifestation of a “mental state in 
speech or action, whereas communication of a mental state requires that one express it with the 
intent that others recognize that state by recognizing that very communicative intention.”  
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000).  Thus, a shoplifter may express her 
intention to get away with pinching a purse, but often she does not intend to communicate that 
intention.  Id.
100
 If the person took that drug before committing the crime, by contrast, he should be punished 
for the same reason we ought to punish people for the crimes they commit when they knowingly 
take drugs or alcohol that might impede their judgment.  Thus, someone who did not remember 
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be implausible to assert that a failure to punish the insane would demoralize 
mentally competent citizens.101  Hence, the first point about retributive justice is 
that retribution instantiates the ideal of individual responsibility and 
accountability.  Punishment communicates to the offender our commitment to 
moral responsibility for the choice between lawful and unlawful conduct.
Punishment also possesses an important expressive function.  When the 
state credibly threatens to use coercion through retributive practices, that threat 
suffices to express the norm that our actions and our interests matter to the state.  
If we insisted that the state actually achieve complete enforcement and 
punishment, we would then be placed in the untenable position of spending all 
of our collective resources on criminal justice. 
On the other hand, punishment itself may not be necessary to 
communicate the value of moral responsibility in particular instances to 
particular offenders.  We might for instance envision an offender who, 
immediately after committing his crime, came forward, accepted responsibility, 
and evidenced his awareness of this ideal through his own process of 
repentance.  So something else is at stake when we say that coercion should be 
used even if some offenders have apparently internalized the significance of the 
first ideal.102
2. Equal Liberty Under Law
Retributive punishment is necessary, even against a quickly repentant 
offender, to effectuate the commitment to the principle of equal liberty under 
law.  In a liberal democracy, punishment serves under equality’s flag because 
we are all equally burdened in our obligation as citizens to obey the law.  When 
someone flouts the law, he actively chooses to untether himself from the 
common enterprise of living peaceably together under a common law.  He is not 
merely rebelling against a particular law that he may disagree with, but rather he 
is defecting from an agreement about the basic structures of liberal democracy 
that he made as a reasonable person in concert with other reasonable people.103
By his act, the criminal implicitly says, “I have greater liberty than you, my 
the crime because she was blisteringly drunk at the time of commission is a proper object of 
punishment because she knowingly undertook action that created an unreasonable risk of harm.  
When someone (absent coercion) becomes so intoxicated that she loses control of her ability to 
comport herself lawfully, there is no wrong in punishing her for the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of that choice to risk losing control of her faculties.  At that point she can 
understand that she is being punished for the crimes resulting from her choice to become 
intoxicated.
101
 That is not to say that no social action is warranted if the person is assessed as requiring 
therapy or some other form of treatment.  But without some inquiry into, and evidence of, the 
knowing malevolence of the offender, the imposition of “punishment” would be unintelligible. 
102
 This insistence on focusing attention on an action by a mentally competent offender 
highlights one of the ways in which “grievance retributivism” can be usefully distinguished from 
“character retributivism.”  Analysis that focuses on the character of the wrongdoer is “character 
retributivism.”  In contrast, analysis that focuses on a particular action (by a mentally competent 
offender) is “grievance retributivism.”  I harbor doubts about character retributivism and its 
proper place within a liberal state, but I need not expand upon those doubts here.  My account 
can be viewed as a species of the grievance retributivism genus, since the only grievances I 
countenance as warranting state-imposed retributive punishment are grievances born of legal 
violations.  See generally MURPHY, supra note 27, at 39 - 56 (discussing kinds of retribution); B. 
Douglas Robbins, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why Capital Sentences Should Be 
Commuted Upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1115, 1123 - 26 (2001) (same).
103
 Because I view punishment as a fundamentally political institution, I find it difficult to 
translate the account of punishment I offer to states that are not liberal democracies and do not 
aspire to be. I have elsewhere adverted to some of the difficulties retributive punishment would 
encounter in wicked states.  See generally Markel, The Justice of Amnesty?, supra note 16, at 
440 – 42.
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fellow citizen.”104  He cuts himself off from the social order for the purpose of 
imposing a new order by his acts against people who should enjoy equal liberty 
as guaranteed by the state’s rule of law.105
Retribution serves as the rejection of this claim and thus effectuates our 
commitment to equal liberty.  Metaphorically, it plants the flag of truth in the 
fortress of the rebel soul.106  For when I steal, rape, or murder, I arrogate a 
license to act in ways officially proscribed by the polity.  My act is a claim of 
superiority: I am a law unto myself, and society’s laws do not bind me.107  On 
this view, it does not matter that few people, if given the chance, would seek to 
steal, rape, or murder.108  All that matters is that I am defecting from a legal 
order to which I have good reason to give my allegiance, and I am defecting in 
such a way that I am taking license to which others are not entitled.  If the state 
104
 One might think that this is hardly what goes on in the mind of most criminals.  Undoubtedly, 
many criminals are not consciously articulating this maxim as they pick a pocket or steal a car.  
Indeed, it is true that there might be many maxims to be inferred from a criminal’s behavior.  
But the question is whether there is plausible evidence to sustain one or several of these 
interpretations.  Part of what makes an interpretation of social fact plausible is that we decide to 
announce that this is how we will interpret this kind of behavior prospectively.  This 
interpretation is defensible, for when we affirm the moral agency of the offender through 
retribution, we recognize that he himself might have acted for venal reasons, perhaps nothing 
quite so grand as political rebellion or insult to fellow citizens. But by holding him accountable 
for his actions, we treat him better than he treated others, because we respect his capacity for 
moral decision-making.  Of course, there will be certain circumstances when it is fully 
implausible to infer these maxims from a person’s behavior and when those circumstances 
attach, retribution would not be sought, or at least, not in the same way or to the same extent. 
This is what creates room for excuses, justifications and mitigating circumstances, such as 
necessity, self-defense, and provocation.
105
 The statement of exclusion described in the account here is similar to the parable of the 
wicked or contrary son who sits at the Passover Seder table and asks: “‘What is the meaning of 
this service to you?’  Saying ‘you,’ he excludes himself, and because he excludes himself from 
the group, he denies a basic principle that he too is obligated to abide by the laws and norms.”  
See THE PASSOVER HAGGADA, available at
http://www.chabad.org/holidays/passover/pesach.asp?AID=1737 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
106 See C.S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 95 (1944).  Contrary to Lewis, from whom this 
expression is borrowed, I mean truth in a very local and contingent sense here.  The “truth” here 
refers to the prima facie respect a democratically passed law ought to receive when it conforms 
with liberal parameters.  
107
 Some might argue that the ubiquity of claims of superiority in society undermines the claim 
that crime, unlike other actions, is a claim of superiority that merits special attention.  But this 
misses the point on several levels. First, some claims of superiority are socially acceptable, e.g., 
a claim that American Airlines has the best on-time arrival history.  More to the point, crime is a 
species of the genus of claims of superiority, and it gets particular attention because we have 
agreed, through our democratic institutions, to give it that attention.  Professor Husak, for 
example, suggests that when someone wrongs me in a way that is not criminally sanctioned, she 
also deserves some punishment, or absent state-imposed punishment, some degree of suffering.  
See Husak, supra note 14, at 971 - 72.  This confuses things.  There is an array of wrongs, 
slights, or inconveniences people may impose.  Not all of them merit criminal sanctions simply 
because it might not be feasible to expend scarce social resources upon prosecuting all of them.  
There are nonlegal but still permissible sanctions that can be inflicted upon people who commit 
these noncriminal wrongs: for example, reputational retaliation, gossip, avoidance, competition. 
Some or all of these responses may also communicate the norm of moral accountability, but 
these responses are not limited, as retribution is, to the ambit of punishing legislatively 
proscribed behavior.  Finally, and with thanks to my friend Chad Flanders for this point, I note 
that some false claims to superiority may be better addressed through legal, but non-criminal 
law, mechanisms: e.g., in some places, estate or wealth taxes can be used to deflate or reduce 
pretensions of high-born superiority, tempering the environment under which such pretensions 
are typically born.
108
 Thus, we can sidestep the criticisms of the “fair-play” theory of punishment associated with 
Herb Morris’s famous essay, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION
40, 42 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1973).  Morris thought that retribution is deserved for criminal 
wrongs because a criminal’s action “renounces a burden which others have voluntarily assumed 
and thus [he] gains an advantage which others . . . do not possess.”  Id.  Thus, punishment is 
necessary to end free riding on the political agreement of others.  The problem here is that we do 
not punish in order to end free riding itself, but rather to communicate moral norms to offenders 
and nonoffenders alike about acceptable conduct.  The fact that free riding might terminate by 
threat of punishment is a consequence of retribution but not its purpose.
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establishes no institution that credibly attempts to prosecute and punish me, my 
claim to superiority over others commands greater plausibility than it would be 
if the state created such an institution.109
By making credible the threat to impose some level of punishment, the 
state is giving its best reasonable efforts to reduce the plausibility of individuals’ 
false claims of superiority.110  The state’s coercive measures communicate the 
norm of equal liberty under the law and they are directed to the person most in 
need of hearing it: the offender.  This theory reveals in part, then, how the 
practice of punishment is intelligible and attractive, apart from the other 
beneficial consequences that may contingently arise from its practice.
3. Democratic Self-Defense
The reasons mentioned so far--effectuating moral responsibility and 
equal liberty under law--do not explain why the state should be the institution 
that punishes.  I have explained only why an offender’s action deserves 
punishment for committing a wrong.  Why should the state play the central and 
exclusive role in criminal justice?  After all, it is only a modern phenomenon 
that the state has assumed such a function; clergymen and other communal 
figures used to play an extensive role in administering punishment.  Moreover, 
today, the state’s monopoly on punishment is under attack again.  In a 
provocative article, Professor Dan Kahan has said that it is time “to get over” the 
kind of thinking about criminal law that permits the state to “monopolize” 
legitimate force: “Just as air travel and telecommunications have been freed 
from inefficient forms of centralized control, so punishment is due for a 
liberating dose of privatization.”111  Suggesting that inner-city communities 
insufficiently respect the state’s criminal laws, Kahan contends that, in the face 
of such “enfeebled legitimacy,” the answer is to rely on the moral authority of 
private institutions and actors, such as the “Black church and juveniles,” as 
substitutes for state punishment.112  Kahan, oddly, seems to prefer exacerbating 
the allegedly enfeebled legitimacy of the state instead of succoring it.  To 
address his argument, I need to answer the question: what justifies the state’s 
role in punishment?
The state plays the role of the exclusive decision maker (at least with 
respect to punishment) because it, and it alone, has the capacity for legitimacy 
among all actors in society in a way that various communal institutions in our 
pluralistic social union of social unions do not.113  Kahan’s empirical claims--
that various subcommunities no longer recognize the state’s legitimacy--are not 
109
 This rationale that I articulate--that punishment is defending equal liberty under law--is 
inspired in part by Jean Hampton and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, but it has developed its 
own unique features too.  Whereas Hampton’s work defended a non-political account of 
retribution that was victim-focused, see Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting 
Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1659 – 1702 (1992), and Hegel’s 
work is metaphysically encumbered, see GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF 
RIGHT (H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1820), the account I offer here seems 
more straightforward and is capacious enough to include “victimless” crimes that are legislated 
as a product of democratic deliberation.  By taking a victim-centered approach, Hampton failed, 
to my mind, to see the social implications of the claim to superiority in criminal actions and 
missed the institutional dimension of equal liberty under law.  Furthermore, her account is ill-
equipped to explain why we punish crimes that do not specifically demean a particular victim, 
such as embezzling from a corporation.  
110
 The idea of punishment reducing the plausibility of the claim of superiority over the victim is 
from Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 26, at 111. 
111
 Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the 
Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860 (1999).
112 Id. at 1862.
113 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).  The fact of social pluralism is in 
part what motivates and justifies reliance upon an impartial agent, such as the state, to administer 
justice in modern times. 
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only implausible; they are normatively unacceptable from an ex ante viewpoint.  
By ex ante, I refer to a perspective where a person internalizes all available 
information about possible outcomes except the identity of what position she 
will occupy later.  This “ideal observer” status guarantees an element of 
impartiality that better yields the practices and policies for an attractive society 
and state.114  The communities of which Kahan speaks may be opposed to the 
harsh federal or state drug laws that require stiff mandatory minimum sentences.  
But Kahan marshals no evidence to suggest that they think some other political 
body has a more legitimate claim to legislate, adjudicate, and punish them in a 
society with demographics like ours.  Moreover, if we are interested in, as we 
should be, what someone would choose ex ante, that is, not knowing whether 
she will be black, white, male, female, etc., we would have little reason to be 
stirred by Kahan’s provocations.  Instead, we should embrace the procedural 
cautions that characterize state action in a liberal constitutional regime.115
But there exists an additional, more fundamental reason for the state’s 
involvement in retribution.  Note that while revenge rarely occurs for acts that 
are not immediately or transparently victim-oriented, retribution, by contrast, 
occurs for acts that are either malum in se (bad by nature) or malum prohibitum
(bad because it is prohibited by legal convention).  Moreover, some wrongs, 
such as treason or counterfeiting currency, where the victim is collective and not 
specifically identifiable, necessitate the state’s involvement.116
Accordingly, the third idea communicated to the offender through a 
retributive understanding of punishment is the notion of democratic self-defense.  
Recall the claim of superiority made by an offender’s action against his victim.  
That claim of superiority, however implicit, is not merely a claim against his 
victim.  Indeed, there may not be a direct victim against whom to make this 
claim.  Rather, the offense is an active rebellion against the political order of 
equal liberty under law.  Each time an offense occurs, the offender tries to shift 
where the rules of property, liability, and inalienability lie.117  In doing so, the 
criminal revolts against the constitutionally democratic determinations of where 
those rules lie.  He usurps the sovereign will of the people by challenging their 
decision-making structure.118
114
 We might, following Roderick Firth, say that an “ideal observer” is someone who is 
omniscient about relevant non-ethical facts; is consistent, disinterested, dispassionate; and 
otherwise normal.  Roderick Firth, Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, 7 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 317, 333 - 45 (1952). The reason we use the ex ante perspective 
within a retributivist framework is explained infra in III.D.  In brief, under my framework, I can 
explain the internal attractiveness of retributive punishment and at the same time show that its 
animating values require a recognition that retributive justice is merely one attractive moral 
project competing among others, and therefore balancing of the costs and consequences 
associated with the project of retributive justice is required.  That balancing should be done 
through the ex ante perspective to assure that the rules and institutions we choose are not the 
product of bias that inevitably arises when we make choices ex post.
115
 That said, we would not necessarily create the Leviathan of Hobbes ex ante because we 
realize that state power, without proper checks and balances, can be oppressive and abusive, and 
we might also want to have power-sharing arrangements so that some decision-making about 
local issues devolves to more local entities, permitting some experimentation and variation.  But 
conduct that the legislature has prohibited is conduct that the community represented by that 
legislature, not the sub-community, should punish. 
116 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 3 - 38 (1988).
117 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing when 
entitlement should be protected under property, liability or inalienability rules).
118 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 124 (1990). This 
justification is sometimes challenged by those who, like Husak, view the criminal law chiefly as 
an instrument to vindicate the suffering of the victim with the suffering of the offender.  See
Husak, supra note 14, at 973. Thus, victimless crimes are less of a concern and therefore less 
likely to require punishment. The problem is that such an account provides no reason to discount 
the rights and interests of collective bodies.  Husak’s suffering-focused account also mistakenly 
concludes by implication, if not directly, that all suffering is the same in quality, even if not in 
quantity. Surely the hardship one endures from imprisonment is different from the hardship 
caused by the loss of a child or the pain of a paper cut.  Husak’s argument, which was developed 
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Hence, the offense is not merely against the victim but also against the 
people and their agent, the state, whose charter mandates the protection, not only 
of the persons constituting the political order, but also the protection of the 
decision-making authority of the regime itself.  Indeed, as an empirical matter, it 
is interesting to see how democratic self-defense is a principle embodied in the 
oath taken by federal officers.119  The substance of that oath is to protect the 
decision-making structure of the nation.  That these officers swear the oath 
illuminates the idea that the Constitution must be defended against attack by 
those who shift the rules unlawfully, thus revealing crimes as, to a greater or 
lesser degree, forms of political rebellion.120
Of course, not all crimes look like rebellions, and not all rebellions need 
be quashed with maximal use of resources.121  Quite to the contrary, the scarcity 
of social resources in a society committed to pursuing various projects of moral 
significance requires a principle of frugal proportionality in punishment--that is, 
we should expend that quantum of social resources necessary to convey the 
seriousness of the norms breached by the offender, but not more.122  Previous 
accounts of retributivism have had difficulty explaining what proportionality is 
and why it is relevant to the justification of punishment.  On the account 
provided here, one can see how concern for the wise allocation of social 
resources would lead a legislator to endorse sentences commensurate with the 
severity of the crime (and its concomitant social costs) but neither more nor less 
under normal circumstances.123
in a more qualified form by KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 173 (1989), suggests that as long as the suffering is “equivalent,” the 
“intui tions” of retributive justice are satisfied.  See Husak, supra note 14, at 973. Once one 
realizes the variegated nature of suffering and its multiple social meanings, one realizes the 
shortcomings of this claim.
119
 American oaths of office typically begin with the phrase: “I, ___, do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic.” E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000).
120
 The doctrines of duress or necessity might excuse or justify actions that otherwise look 
criminal.  See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09, 3.02 (1962).  And indeed, in some unjust societies, 
or with respect to some unjust practices, some rebellions should succeed.  That critique, 
however, is basically one against legislation, not punishment.  For the ordinary case of malum in 
se crimes, or crimes that are reasonably malum prohibitum, one’s criminal actions may be seen 
as an expression of defiance against the decision-making regime and the people who make the 
decisions developed in presumptively legitimate constitutional regimes.  As I mentioned earlier, 
this may not be one’s motive, but it is a reasonable reading of the offender’s actions, and its 
underlying intent to bring about those actions.  To the extent that we want to see certain excuses
or defenses available in criminal law that mitigate or thwart punishment precisely because we do 
not believe that under the circumstances they can plausibly be read as rebellions against the 
political order, we have that opportunity--through democratic action.
121
 And, it should be said, a regime whose decision-making power is illegitimate has less moral 
claim to punish those without fair and formal access to participate in political matters.  See
Markel, The Justice of Amnesty?, supra note 16.
122 Cf. Hugo Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America Today, in
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY 15, 34 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell, eds. 2004) 
(discussing the principle of Minimum Invasion, which states that societies ought to abolish any 
lawful practice that imposes more violation of liberty, privacy or autonomy than necessary 
“when a less invasive practice is available and is sufficient” to satisfy the objective).
123
 The account in the text not only limns the often obscured connection between the 
proportionality principle and retributive justice; it provides, through its linkage with the principle 
of frugality, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION Ch. XV (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., The Athlone Press 1970) (1789), a well 
of conceptual resources to draw upon in challenging grossly disproportionate sentences.  A 
legislator alert to this rationale keeps it in mind when drafting or delegating the creation of a 
sentencing guideline structure.  I should add that it is not always the case that increasing the 
severity of the punishment always increases the amount of social resources deployed; if one 
viewed amputation of an arm as a more severe punishment than a year in prison, maybe the 
calculations would change, and call for a different analysis.  Finally, the social cost of a crime is 
not merely the economic cost in dollars.  Nor is it something that is “repaid” through 
pun ishment: taking offenders out of the labor force and away from their families may often 
increase certain costs.  But when I use the term “social cost,” I mean to include a variety of 
factors, including costs associated with detection, prosecution, and punishment, as well as social 
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B. Retributive Justice as an Institutional Practice
By explaining how the creation of credible institutions of retributive 
punishment effectuates moral responsibility, equal liberty under law, and 
democratic self-defense, the CCR excavates what good inheres in the practice of 
retributive punishment.  Revealing the intrinsic good (or internal intelligibility) 
achieved by punishment of a guilty offender in turn explains the conceptual 
linkage between legal guilt and punishment.  By contrast, utilitarian 
justifications for institutions of punishment (e.g., deterrence or rehabilitation) 
rest on contingent goals being achieved through punishment of offenders, when, 
in fact there is no need for a person to have committed a crime to pursue those 
goals.124  The utilitarian committed to deterrence, for example, must be open-
minded about abandoning punishment if harm reduction can be achieved more 
easily through LoJacks and architectural design of public space.125  Similarly, 
someone committed to the rehabilitation of persons with anti-social behavior has 
no need to wait for a crime to occur to justify the intervention of the state upon 
the offender.126  He just needs to see someone who looks like a threat to society 
to impose some form of preventive detention or other form of treatment.  Even 
restorative justice advocates cannot explain why their program of realizing 
social equality through sentencing circles has to be linked to the occurrence of a 
crime, as opposed to an insult or some other tort.127  That does not mean that 
these other theories are wholly inappropriate justifications for institutions of 
punishment.  It just means that they cannot provide a conceptual linkage 
between legal guilt and punishment for criminal offenses. 
Because retribution instantiates the widely accepted and attractive 
principles of moral accountability for unlawful action, equal liberty under law, 
and democratic self-defense, the practice of retribution possesses an internally 
intelligible character.  It is a practice that, generally speaking, can be justified 
apart from the contingent benefits (such as specific or general deterrence) that it 
might generate.  
Moreover, the CCR permits us to see why, without recourse to or 
reliance upon mere intuitions or emotions of vengeance, resentment, or 
hatred,128 the state should establish institutions of criminal justice that take care 
to punish only the guilty, and not the innocent.  The guilty should be punished to 
contest their false claims for the reasons mentioned earlier.  The innocent should 
not be punished because they have neither made claims of legal superiority 
through their actions nor have they usurped power from the decision-making 
structure to which they have good reason to obey ex ante.
Nonetheless, there are some internal limits to retributive justice that still 
need to be articulated.  First, as I alluded to earlier, the practice of retribution is 
only one attractive social practice among many.  Every person interested in 
social planning must realize that, on the margins, resources spent on the project 
judgments of severity. 
124
 The utilitarian, it has been said, would scapegoat an innocent person, but the rule utilitarian 
has a sufficiently good reply to this claim that it does not seem to make sense to drag out the 
familiar arguments.  See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 13 (1955) 
(defending “utilitarianism against those objections which have traditionally been made against it 
in connection with punishment”); Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 347 – 50 (2002) (same); Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution, Punishment, 
and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 1005 (1985) (explaining the utilitarian view that 
punishment of the innocent is counterproductive).
125 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002); Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261 (2003).
126
 A related story appears in the Steven Spielberg film, MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century 
Fox and Dreamworks 2002)(based on the Philip K. Dick story, The Minority Report), where law 
enforcement officers intervene prior to the commission of the crime based on information 
gleaned from usually reliable beings with special skills in divining the future.
127
 On restorative justice, see sources cited supra note 61.
128 See sources cited supra notes 26 - 30.
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of retributive justice are resources not spent on feeding the hungry, housing the 
homeless, and healing the sick.129  Thus, to say that retributive justice justifies 
punishment under ordinary circumstances does not mean that punishment ought 
to be imposed under all circumstances such that the ceaseless pursuit of justice 
consumes our every and last unit of social resources.130  This is consistent with 
retributivism’s animating moral ideals because, far from being unconcerned with 
consequences, retributivists urge on offenders the maxim that one cannot 
disclaim responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable results of one’s actions.  
That same maxim cannot be ignored when retributivists are designing systems 
of justice or advocating reforms therein.  Relatedly, the practice of retribution 
poses significant risks of error and abuse by authorities.  Hence, it is a practice 
that can be commended only when all reasonable measures are taken to reduce 
those risks.  
Second, embedded in the account of the CCR is an intent requirement.  
To insist only on the offender’s perception of his defeat, to the exclusion of the 
potential internalization of correct values that the confrontation encourages, 
would undermine the justificatory prong first discussed, namely the interest we 
have in recognizing each other as dignity-bearing moral agents capable of 
responsible decision making.  In order to militate against the corrosive effect 
punishment may have upon the offender and the public, it is crucial that the 
denial of the offender’s message is explained and carried out in a way that is 
conducive to the internalization of the values that the retributive encounter is 
meant to uphold.  The encounter need not guarantee the internalization of those 
values, but it cannot proceed without the desire for that result, and the state 
ought not take measures that would preclude it.  Otherwise, retribution would 
operate mechanistically, a practice that devalues both the punished and the 
punishing state.  Consequently, the state must have as its hope not just the denial 
of the offender’s claim of superiority, but also his transformation.131
C. Confrontational Retribution as Distinct from Revenge
If we agree that these principles animate a nobler image of retributive 
justice, then we can see how retributive justice might usefully be contrasted with 
revenge, contra the courts and commentators.132  To begin with, what induces 
retributive punishment is the offense against the legal order.  Where the law runs 
out, so must retribution.  By contrast, revenge may address slights, injuries, 
insults, or nonlegal wrongs.  The philosopher Robert Nozick identified five 
other characteristics that tend to distinguish retribution from revenge:  
(a) retribution ends cycles of violence, whereas revenge fosters them; 
(b) retribution limits punishment to that which is in proportion to the 
wrongdoing, whereas revenge is limitless in principle; (c) retribution is 
impartially administered by the state, whereas revenge is often personal; 
(d) retributivists seek the equal application of the criminal law, whereas no 
generality attaches to the avenger’s interest; and (e) retribution is cool and 
unemotional, whereas revenge has a particular emotional tone of taking pleasure 
in the suffering of another.133
129 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Chance for Peace, Address before the American Society for 
Newspaper Editors (Apr. 16, 1953) (“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every 
rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who 
are cold and are not clothed.”), available at http://www.quotedb.com/speeches/chance-for-peace.
130
 If, hypothetically, creating institutions of criminal justice led to more crime or more 
starvation, then it is even more clear that the invocation of fiat iustitia, pereat mundus (Let 
justice be done even though the world may be destroyed) is wrong-headed.  The law exists to 
secure the conditions of human flourishing, not to destroy them.    
131
 Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, supra note 16, at 2209 - 10.
132 See sources cited supra note 13.
133 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366 – 68 (1981);  cf. Ezekiel 33:11 (“I have 
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A few other important distinctions can be drawn: (f) retribution is always 
targeted at the offender,134 whereas revenge may target an offender’s relatives or 
allies;135 (g) retribution is uninterested in making the offender experience 
generic suffering; rather, and quite distinct from revenge, retribution seeks to 
use the state’s power to coerce the offender in particular ways, such that certain 
ideas can be communicated through that coercion;136 (h) retribution is interested 
in, and speaks to, the moral autonomy and dignity of the offender, whereas 
revenge may be indifferent to those qualities; such indifference crucially affects 
whether and what kind of excuses might limit revenge or retribution; (i) and 
finally, retribution’s intent requirement, discussed above, requires that the 
punishment not preclude the internalization of the “sense of justice” that would 
allow for an offender to demonstrate his respect for the norms of moral 
responsibility, equal liberty under law, and democratic self-defense, whereas 
revenge has no such requirement.137
The value of retribution, on this account, is realized when the state 
makes the attempt to confront the offender and communicate these norms to the 
offender through its coercive power against him.  Thus, at this point, we can 
begin to see why this is called the Confrontational Conception of Retribution.  
Let me explain that notion through another thought experiment.  Imagine 
that a person commits a typical crime (e.g., theft), and is then tried fairly, but in 
secret, so that the public is unaware of the encounter between the state and the 
criminal.138  The trial has familiar evidentiary requirements, the defendant has 
access to legal counsel, and so on.  The accused is convicted.  The sentence 
accords with the idea of proportionality discussed earlier.  The thought 
experiment simply says it is a typical trial and a typical punishment; it is just 
that the record of this conviction will not be publicly available.  Neither public 
reconciliation nor potential social condemnation is ever achieved because of the 
secrecy, so the encounter has no socially expressive value and thus has no 
general deterrence value.  This type of proceeding will not satisfy the average 
person’s taste for fairness in a particular case, nor will ignorance of this trial 
damage the average person’s confidence in the legal system.  
Is there still value to the secret confrontation?  On the account offered 
here, the answer is yes, and therefore it is to be preferred to a situation where no 
retribution occurs at all.  This is because the confrontational relationship has its 
own internal goals and goods that are achieved independent of any contingent 
no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live.”).
134
 Retribution is targeted exclusively at the offender because it is the offender whose actions 
implicitly claim superiority against the polity and the victim.  By contrast, the offender’s family 
members or allies do not make those claims--unless they aid and abet the offense, in which case 
they too are making claims of superiority that the state has not sanctioned.  While the offender’s 
family may have failed to inculcate proper law-abiding behavior, they bear no culpability as 
persons under the law for the action that we strongly presume was the product of the offender’s 
free choice.
135
 Here I do not mean to deny that retribution may impose third-party harms, nor do I suggest 
that revenge is always targeted at third parties close to the offender.  My point is narrow: 
retribution does not aim to harm third parties, and in some cases, the kind of retribution imposed 
should take into account innocent third-party harms.
136
 One can imagine that someone interested in revenge who sees his antagonist experience 
suffering from some other source, such as disease or extremely bad luck (getting hit by a car), 
may decline to follow through on the revenge, whereas the state’s retributive interest would not 
be satisfied merely by having an offender suffer.  Often, for example, the state puts prison 
guards on suicide watches to prevent inmates from killing themselves.  This practice highlights 
the normative significance of the distinction between punishment and suffering.
137 See Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, supra note 16, at 2216 – 17.
138
 This hypothetical scenario is not so unimaginable.  Cf. Memorandum from Michael J. 
Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge of the United States, to Immigration Judges and Court 
Administrators 1 (Sept. 21, 2001) (instructing immigration judges to close their courtrooms in 
some situations), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf; Press 
Release, The White House, President Issues Military Order (Nov. 13, 2001) (establishing by 
executive order non-public military tribunals), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html.
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good.  Some might say that the good brought about is that the offender is 
brought to justice.  My goal has been to elucidate that claim.  By its efforts, the 
state diminishes the plausibility of evidence to a claim of superiority and makes
some effort at complying with the charter that gives the state its legitimacy.  On 
this account, secret and fair punishments are better than no punishments at all 
because the encounter between the state and criminal effectuates the ideal of 
treating citizens as free, equal, and morally responsible.139  In addition, the 
opportunity for the state to communicate its message and for the offender to 
internalize it is preserved.
As long as one accepts that some secret and fair punishment is better 
than no punishment at all, one can grasp the internal intelligibility of retribution.  
The theorist seeking general deterrence or publicly expressed condemnation 
cannot see the value of secret punishment,140 but the retributivist can.141  To be 
sure, the retributivist might approve of the byproducts of public awareness of 
punishment (deterrence, denunciation, social self-defense, and possible 
reconciliation), but the retributive encounter remains valuable independent of 
those reasons.  Indeed, there may be a host of ancillary benefits.142  But these 
benefits are of an entirely contingent nature, whereas retribution’s intelligibility 
is perceptible strictly within the relationship between state and offender. 
Having explained what is “confrontational” about the CCR, and having 
provided an account of retributive justice that explains punishment’s 
attractiveness and internally intelligible nature, I now turn to the questions at the 
heart of this article: whether blanket commutations of death row are compatible 
with retributive justice, and if so, what implications arise for the death penalty 
itself.  
IV. RETRIBUTIVISM AND RYAN’S BLANKET COMMUTATION
Recall from Part II that there were four criticisms of Governor Ryan’s 
blanket commutation.  First, one might call Governor Ryan’s commutation an 
abuse of power that is “morally indiscriminate” in character, and thus one that 
damages the credibility of our justice system.143  Related to this claim is the 
139 It is fair to resist this idea as a general practice, as I explain in the text.  I think our hesitation 
occurs because we are so accustomed to enjoying the benefits of public transparency with 
respect to punishment.  Our commitment to transparency and accountability, coupled with 
skepticism of the possibility of fair punishments occurring as a general matter, make it difficult 
for us to imagine secret punishments as an ongoing social practice.  Secret but fair punishment is 
a suboptimal arrangement. The real question is whether we would prefer it to a state of affairs 
where there was no punishment at all.  I think we would agree that on this account there is some 
value to secret but fair punishments.
140
 One might argue that the secret punishment could serve the task of specific deterrence, but if 
we imagine the imposed punishment was a severe fine, in addition to stiff and unpleasant 
community service, but was still insufficient to guarantee the specific deterrence of the offender, 
then the value of the secret punishment would still not be apparent to that person advocating the 
primacy of specific deterrence.
141
 I should note that I am not embracing the practice of secret retribution.  Indeed, the account I 
have offered indicates there is an obligation to have some degree of transparency in the 
administration of criminal justice.  The state’s concealment of the encounter can be read by 
citi zens as a message of inactivity by the state, which would itself run afoul of the principal-
agent relation that motivates the state’s participation in the matter.  Not meeting the transparency 
requirement does not itself vitiate the good of the confrontation between state and offender, but 
it does create its own moral problems that ought to be avoided. 
142
 Chief among them is the benefit to society’s interest in verifying that the proposition of equal 
liberty under law is still being vouchsafed by its government.  Note, however, that some of these 
ancillary benefits could be realized without having to visit pain or deprivation of liberty upon 
each offender.  The healing that victims might gain from the knowledge of punishment could be 
gained through other forms of therapy made available by the state or other bodies within civil 
society.
143 Firestone, supra note 3, at 5 (reporting Senator Joseph Lieberman’s characterization of the 
commutation); see also Blecker, supra note 8, at 303 (“Above and beyond its cruelty and 
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concern that a blanket commutation is “explicitly, even exuberantly, anti-
democratic.”144  Second, one might regard Ryan’s blanket commutation as an 
improper act of mercy.  Third, one might think that the commutation was 
improper because it revived or exacerbated the suffering of victims and their 
survivors.  In the words of George Will, Ryan’s action was a “cavalier laceration 
of the unhealable wounds of those who mourn the victims of the killers the state 
of Illinois condemned.”145  Finally, many people presume that retributivists 
support the death penalty (at least for murderers) and that retribution theory 
justifies the death penalty.146  Hence, by issuing a blanket commutation of the 
death row inmates, Ryan “let murderers off the hook.”147
As I examine these various arguments from the perspective of the CCR, 
keep in mind that these criticisms (and my responses) may differ in their 
applicability to a blanket commutation of death row as distinct from the use of 
the death penalty more generally.  In this Part, I focus on the blanket 
commutation; in the next Part, I consider the retributivist critique of the death 
penalty writ large.
A. Abuse of Power Reconsidered
As we saw earlier, various critics of Ryan--including scholars, 
commentators, and politicians--claimed his actions were unlawful, anti-
democratic and an abuse of power.  In this section I will argue that these charges 
are inaccurate and that Ryan acted completely within his legal rights conferred 
upon him by and within a constitutional democratic regime.  Nonetheless, the 
fact that Ryan’s blanket commutation was lawful does not by itself mean the 
action should bear the stamp of moral legitimacy; demonstrating moral 
legitimacy requires additional argumentation that I provide in the sections 
following this one.148
Some retributivists have indicated that case-by- case review is required in 
assessing who should be executed.  Most notably, Professor Robert Blecker, an 
avowed retributivist who often appears in the media, criticized Ryan’s 
commutation because it was “morally indiscriminate,” and thus allowed some of 
the “worst of the worst” offenders to enjoy a reprieve that they did not 
deserve.149  Similarly, although not in the specific context of the Ryan 
commutation, philosopher Kathleen Dean Moore developed a retributivist 
account of the pardon and articulated the need for case-by- case review 
therein.150  She wrote that “the only good and sufficient reason for pardoning a
callousness, [Ryan’s commutation] was a morally indiscriminate act.”).
144
 Will, supra note 4, at B7; cf. Robert Blecker, Among Killers, Searching For the Worst of the 
Worst, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2000, at B1 (“A great majority of the American people support the 
death penalty for those who deserve it.”).
145 See Will, supra note 4, at B7.
146 See sources cited supra note 73.  
147 Sarat, supra note 69, at 1347; O’Brien, supra note 64, at 5A.
148
 Even some of Ryan’s critics acknowledge that Ryan did not violate “the letter of the law;” 
instead they state that he “certainly violated the spirit of it by usurping the power of the Illinois 
Legislature and courts.”  Wallace, supra note 1, at 394; see also Garvey, supra note 2, at 1325.
149
 Blecker, supra note 8, at 303.
150 MOORE, supra note 118, at 167 - 68.  To determine if a pardon would be warranted on 
retributivist grounds, Moore would ask whether any one of the following conditions applied:  
(a) whether an offender’s crime was justified because it was conscientiously performed and 
morally justified; (b) whether the crime was excusable because the offender gained nothing from 
the crime for one or more of several reasons: the offender acted unintentionally and made full 
reparations, he was the only victim of his crime, his crime repaired rather than created an 
injustice, or the crime was coerced; (c) whether an offender suffers what he deserves (or more) 
as a result of the crime, say by killing his own child through reckless driving; (d) whether a 
terminal illness afflicts the offender in prison, making the offender suffer more by the 
punishment because he has to die in prison; (e) whether the punishment is disproportionate to the 
offense; and (f) whether the lingering effects of the crime add unwarranted punishment--for 
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felon is that justice is better served by pardoning than by punishing in that 
particular case.”151  Thus, it is highly probable that Moore, like Kant and 
Professors Blecker and Garvey, would conclude that commuting death row 
sentences would violate retributive justice.       
Against these views, it is important to explain how a retributivist could 
(and should) embrace Governor Ryan’s action, especially when the laws 
permitting the death penalty express the popular view in favor of this 
punishment.  In this section, then, I begin that task, locating the argument 
specifically in the context of whether Ryan’s blanket commutation of death row 
sentences was an abuse of power and anti-democratic. 
1. Ryan’s Commutation as Anti-Legislature
Ryan has been criticized for “abusing his clemency power . . . [because] 
he completely undermined the legislature and its law-making function.”152  To 
the extent this criticism suggests that Ryan acted unlawfully (in violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine), it is clearly wrong.  Ryan’s action fell squarely 
within his constitutional discretion, as the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently 
affirmed.153  Article V, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides 
that “[t]he Governor may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after 
conviction, for all offenses on such terms as he thinks proper.”  Had Ryan 
exercised that power in a way that evidenced some form of ethnic or religious 
prejudice, the charge of abuse would stick, because both state and federal 
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection would cabin 
executive discretion.154  However, since Ryan did not exercise his discretion to 
favor a person with some morally arbitrary characteristic, his decision could be 
characterized as neutral across persons.155  Indeed, notwithstanding the Illinois 
example, when an ex-offender cannot get a job even though he has served his time and the 
conviction occurred long ago.  Id. at 11.  I have elsewhere explained the shortcomings of 
Moore’s argument, see Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 16, at 1428 n.22, but here Moore’s 
explanation of justice-enhancing pardons is helpful to show at least the prima facie retributivist 
case against a blanket commutation of death row.  Unless Moore were to argue that the death 
penalty is always too severe for the offense, none of her conditions would be satisfied in the 
exercise of a blanket commutation of death row.
151
 Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 
281 (1993) (emphasis added).
152
 Wallace, supra note 1, at 394.
153
 People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546 (Ill. 2004).
154 See, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[N]o one would contend that a governor could ignore 
the commands of the Equal Protection Clause and use race, religion, or political affiliation as a 
standard for granting or denying clemency.”).  The holding in Woodard is thin gruel.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the plurality gave legs to the traditional and illiberal conception 
of clemency as grace, stating that the “executive’s authority would cease to be a matter of grace 
committed to the executive authority if it were constrained by the sort of procedural 
requirements that respondent urges.”  Id. at 280 – 81 (Rehnquist, J.)(plurality opinion).  
Extending this uncanalized discretion falls far short of the demands of instantiating a robust 
conception of equal liberty under law.  See Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 16, at 1425.
155
 The unreviewable clemency power Ryan possessed is quite similar in scope to the virtually 
unfettered discretion available to prosecutors in determining whether to decline or prosecute a 
case.  See generally Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“This broad discretion 
rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial 
review.”); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982) (“For just as a prosecutor may 
forgo legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a 
prosecutor may file additional charges if an initial expectation that a defendant would plead 
guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded.”); United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1444 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (“The United States Attorney, of necessity, enjoys broad discretion in setting 
prosecutorial priorities.”); Massey v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1355, 1356 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The authority 
to decide against whom federal indictments shall be sought lies almost exclusively with the 
United States Attorneys or the Justice Department, and their decisions in this regard are not 
generally subject to judicial review.”); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 
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Supreme Court’s opinion encouraging future governors to “use the clemency 
power in its intended manner--to prevent miscarriages of justice in individual 
cases,”156 Ryan’s exercise of clemency stood on constitutional terra firma.157
Highlighting Ryan’s broad legal discretion also helps deflect the charge 
that his decision was anti-democratic.  To be sure, if democracy is viewed as 
putting every decision to a plebiscite, then Ryan’s actions would not only be 
anti-democratic but also unlawful.158  But that is not the nature of Illinois’ 
constitutional democracy.  The people ratified the distribution of the sweeping 
pardon power to the governor through the political process of creating and 
preserving a constitution.  And although the state legislature, reflecting the 
peoples’ will, authorized the death penalty in certain cases, the pardon power 
was vested in the executive through the rough and tumble of constitutional 
politics, and the legislature has always retained the opportunity to amend the 
constitution.  The legislative silence in the face of that delegation of power is 
properly understood as a form of democratic action too.  Consequently, the fact 
that the death penalty has a democratic authorization is not a sufficient reason to 
impose it if the people of Illinois also conferred upon Governor Ryan the right to 
commute or pardon as he deems fit. 
2. Ryan’s Commutation as Anti-Jury
The second charge alleging the decision was anti-democratic is 
predicated upon the jury having found that capital punishment was warranted.  
Ryan’s actions, from this perspective, effectively squelched this popular 
voice.159
There is no point in denying that Ryan’s action overturned a jury 
verdict.160  Moreover, this derogation of the jury’s role arguably runs afoul of 
the historically venerated role that the jury occupies in the dispensation of 
criminal justice in America, a point made especially salient by the Supreme 
Court in its Apprendi-Blakely jurisprudence.161
In response, then, let me show how the very arguments provocatively 
advanced by Professors David Hoffman and Kaimi Wenger in defense of 
“nullificatory juries” -- juries that refuse to convict when the facts show the 
1967) (“Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his 
discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings, or what precise 
charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought.”).
156 Madigan, 804 N.E.2d at 560.  That dictum by the Court was unsupported by any authority 
from Illinois that would have constrained Ryan’s actions. 
157 See Sarat & Hussain, supra note 7, at 1312 (explaining the historical ambiguity but ultimate 
legality of sweeping uses of the clemency power). 
158
 Interestingly, however, polls in Illinois after Ryan’s action showed that Ryan’s decision was 
supported by about the same number as those who opposed it.  See DEATH PENALTY INFO.  CTR., 
SUMMARIES OF RECENT POLL FINDINGS (describing February 2003 Zogby International poll that 
shows Illinois residents as evenly divided), at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=210#Illinois (last visited Mar. 16, 
2005).
159 Cf. David Hoffman & Kaimi Wenger, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1119 
(defending the prominent role juries have in nullifying criminal cases or in imposing measures of 
punitive damages that go beyond the achievement of optimal deterrence because juries can serve 
protective, equitable, and participatory roles).
160
 There may have been some offenders who waived a jury trial and allowed the judge to 
sentence them to death, but then the anti-democratic nature of the criticism against Ryan would 
not attach in the first instance.  For background on Illnois’ death sentencing regime, see COMM’N 
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT 3 – 4 (2002), at 
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html.
161
 Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000).  These cases stand for the proposition that a trial judge violates a defendant’s right to a 
jury trial by imposing a heightened sentence based on facts that were neither found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt nor admitted to by the defendant.
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defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt --work as a defense for Ryan’s 
actions.  According to Hoffman and Wenger, nullificatory juries operate as an 
important safety valve in criminal justice because they can serve a role 
protective of defendants against an imperial government or an unwise law, as 
well as an equitable role, providing justice unmediated by rules that are too 
harsh in a particular situation.162  They also see nullificatory juries as an 
important participatory voice in the creation and maintenance of social policies 
against industry or interest group capture of legislatures.163
Without endorsing the presence or growth of the nullificatory jury, I 
want to suggest that Ryan’s blanket commutation also served these three 
purposes, first by protecting defendants from being executed within a system 
that acted erratically (as discussed infra at Section B) and unreliably on the most 
fundamental matters.  The commutation also allowed Ryan to interpolate his 
own sense of equitable fairness into this matter by acting on behalf of all the 
defendants on death row whom he had a shot at saving, and to do so in a manner 
that would not simultaneously endanger society.  After all, Ryan’s action 
relegated all but a handful of the offenders to spend the rest of their lives in 
prison.164  Finally, Ryan’s sweeping use of his clemency power served as his 
opportunity to signal to the legislature his conviction that the system is 
profoundly broken and that until procedures are in place to assure greater 
reliability and accuracy, he would use his authority as a state-wide official to 
stand against the interest groups (whether they are survivors or others) that use 
their political power to impose unjustifiable sentencing policies.
Moreover, even if one does not embrace the value of the nullificatory 
jury in the context of petit juries, it bears mentioning that the source of Ryan’s 
power to extend clemency--the fact that he was elected to state-wide office--was 
arguably more representative of democratic politics than a decision by an 
unelected group of people to convict an offender.  Although juries provide a 
popular voice in criminal justice, and some would say, an important one, they 
are not strictly speaking a democratic body, nor are they truly an effective cross-
section of the political community that passes the laws in their names.  If we 
wanted juries to be representative of the relevant political community that 
passed the laws, then jurors would be drawn in state cases from around the state, 
rather than from a local county or political subdivision.  In addition, there is no 
popular consent to the service rendered by any particular juror in a particular 
case, and jurors have no accountability to each other or to citizens around them 
for how they deliberate and vote.  Taken together, these points undermine the 
view that the jury’s decision to execute an offender should be sacrosanct simply 
because that decision represents the voice of the people. 
Notwithstanding the preceding defense of Ryan’s actions on legal 
grounds, I should emphasize that the CCR is not a purely positivist account of 
legal punishment.  As mentioned at the outset of this section, while the 
lawfulness of Ryan’s actions may be assessed with reference to his 
constitutional powers, evaluating the moral praiseworthiness of those actions 
requires recourse to something other than law.  As made plain earlier, the CCR 
is not wedded to a belief that punishment in any form for any reason is always 
justified solely as a result of the democratic imprimatur of legislation.165  For the 
reasons articulated below, opposition to the death penalty stands as one instance 
where the CCR’s commitment to democracy is outweighed by its fidelity to a 
certain understanding of liberalism, a liberalism that is simultaneously firm and 
162
 Hoffman & Wenger, supra note 159, at 1119.
163 Id. at 1153.
164
 Indeed, some death row offenders were not asking for clemency, perhaps because they 
preferred the finality of execution over life without parole.  I address the significance of this 
infra note 250.
165
 Thus, not all legislatively denominated crimes may be punished on this account.  The laws 
must also conform to liberal principles.  For example, outlawing gay sex is worse in this regard 
than outlawing the consumption of peanut butter on public transit.  
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modest in its confrontations with criminal offenders.
Indeed, standing alone, mere reference to Ryan’s capacious legal powers 
or the democratic source of that power sweeps too broadly to constitute an 
effective retributivist response to the abuse of power challenge.  Had Ryan used 
his executive power to commute the sentence of every murderer, not just those 
on death row, to a single day in prison, there would be solid retributivist grounds 
to view that decision as an abuse of power, even if the commutation did not 
violate constitutional constraints.  This hypothetical reveals that some reliance 
on an extra-legal principle is implicit even in the retributivist account I sketched 
in Part III.  
The extra-legal principle at play here animates the CCR: a concern that 
the state should make adequate efforts to effectuate the ideal of equal liberty 
under law.  If the state, acting through the governor, commutes the sentence of 
every murderer, regardless of the severity of the offense, to one day in prison, 
then the state, by its failure to mete out punishment that is commensurate with 
the severity of the crime, lends plausibility to the offender’s claim of superiority 
over society and his victim.  Punishing insufficiently does not render the state 
complicit in the same wrong the offender committed, but it does aid the 
offender’s claim of superiority, all other things being equal, by undermining the 
state’s earlier effort to contest the false message of superiority that the offender 
projected through his crime.166
This hypothetical merely reveals a continuum of social judgments 
regarding punishment.  Imagine a line that, at the far left, represents a state of 
affairs in which the government makes no attempt to punish any murderers, and, 
at the far right, represents a state of affairs in which the state spends virtually all 
social resources to effectuate retributive justice.  When grounded in good 
reasons, as discussed below, Ryan’s blanket commutation of death row stands 
closer to the right end than to the left end of the line.  By contrast, a blanket 
commutation to one day in prison for all murderers stands closer to the left end 
of the line.  This hypothetical requires us to ask whether there were good 
reasons for a blanket commutation of death row that could be given, and 
whether the alternative of case-by- case review would have sufficed in its stead.      
B. Error and Arbitrariness
As we saw in Part II.B, Ryan defended his actions in part by using the 
discourse of mercy.167  There, I conceded that reliance on the notion of mercy as 
an imperfect obligation could not justify Ryan’s actions.  But what about when 
166
 The argument in the text is subject to the caveat that the obligation to contest that false 
message is defeasible when there are compelling reasons that ought to supervene, e.g., if the 
threat of destruction by an attack against the society requires that all able-bodied persons to fight 
as soldiers.  Absent exigent circumstances, however, the state’s blanket grant of remission of 
punishment to one day in prison looks too much like a grant of impunity.  
The potential difficulties the CCR faces here are twofold: first, the content of the law 
may be illiberal (e.g., a prohibition on consensual sexual relations between men); or second, the 
sentence assigned by the legislature may seem disproportionate to the offense, i.e., extremely 
lenient or excessive.  As to the first problem, the CCR is first and foremost a theory of 
punishment for liberal democracies, and thus it makes no pretense to permit punishment for the 
violation of illiberal laws.  The proper object of critique in this situation is not the judges who 
apply the laws but the legislature that creates them.  The same can be said for punishments that 
are disproportionate, unless the constitution has vested in judges or other state actors the ability 
to strike down practices that are cruel or excessive.  In that situation, the judges should simply 
apply their considered judgment, and then if the judges are viewed as being egregiously wrong, 
the people can amend the constitution to “fix” the mistake.  Letting philosophers or mullahs 
pronounce their distate for a particular practice is an insufficient and unacceptable alternative to 
the ardors of democracy.  
167
 Quoting Lincoln, Ryan said: “‘I have always found that mercy bears richer fruits than strict 
justice.’ I can only hope with God’s help that will be so.”  See Ryan, supra note 42.
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mercy is merely understood as equity, that is to say, what about when mercy is 
understood simply as the perfection of justice?
Through the lens of mercy as equity, the true thrust of Ryan’s articulated 
defense of his actions becomes visible: it was based on concerns central to the 
retributive project: specifically, accuracy in adjudication and equal justice under 
law.168  Ryan had imposed a moratorium in Illinois prior to his commutations in 
response to a finding that Illinois had erroneously sentenced to death thirteen of 
its death row inmates, which was quite striking considering that only twelve 
others had been executed.169  Moreover, he found that a murder committed in 
one county in Illinois could lead to a likelihood of receiving the death penalty 
five times what it would be for the same crime in another county.170  Inveighing 
against this arbitrary distribution in the death penalty, the frequency of error in 
its imposition, and the finality associated with the punishment, Ryan thought it 
was not unreasonable to take all steps possible to avoid inflicting penalties that 
preclude the possibility of correcting wrongful convictions before it is 
impossible to do so.  Far from finding that Illinois was “drowning in due process 
for offenders,”171 Ryan’s blue ribbon commission found evidence the system 
was in dire need of repair.172  Indeed, Ryan’s insistence upon a reliable process 
of guilt-determination conveys, rather than disparages, retribution’s ambition.
Moreover, because the evidence indicated gross disparities in the 
distribution of the death penalty based on morally arbitrary characteristics such 
as race or intrastate geography,173 there was strong reason to think that the 
168
 Note that a concern for equality in punishment can be expressed in at least two ways.  First, 
by creating institutions of criminal justice to punish persons for offenses against the law, we 
effectuate the commitment to equal liberty under law, as explained in Part III.A, supra, by 
showing that the offender does not possess greater liberty than his fellow citizens.  Second, by 
administering the institutions of criminal justice in a fair and even-handed way, we show that 
concern for equality by treating like cases alike, and unlike cases differently.  A system of justice 
whose procedures failed to treat similarly situated offenders similarly would erode the very 
principle of equality under which punishment is legitimately imposed.  For example, the state 
would fail to vindicate equal liberty under law if it refused to prosecute crimes committed on 
Tuesdays, or crimes by people who make more than $50,000 a year.  Thus, the commitment to 
equal liberty under law entails an equally vigorous commitment to the fair and impartial 
application of the criminal laws themselves. 
169 See id. (“In Illinois last year we had about 1000 murders, only 2 percent of that 1000 were 
sentenced to death.  Where is the fairness and equality in that?  The death penalty in Illinois is 
not imposed fairly or uniformly because of the absence of standards for the 102 Illinois State 
Attorneys, who must decide whether to request the death sentence.  Should geography be a 
factor in determining who gets the death sentence?  I don’t think so but in Illinois it makes a 
difference. You are 5 times more likely to get a death sentence for first-degree murder in the 
rural area of Illinois than you are in Cook County.  Where is the justice and fairness in that?  
Where is the proportionality?”).
170 See id.
171 See Wallace, supra note 1, at 395.
172
 The Commission made eighty-five recommendations to fix the death penalty scheme in 
Illinois, including the following:
Videotaping of all interrogations of capital suspects conducted in a police 
facility. . . .  Forbidding capital punishment in cases where the conviction is 
based solely on the testimony of a single eyewitness.  Barring capital 
punishment in cases where the defendant is mentally retarded.  Establishing a 
state-wide commission--comprised of the Attorney General, three prosecutors, 
and a retired judge--to confirm a local state’s attorney’s decision to seek the 
death penalty.  Intensifying the scrutiny of testimony provided by in-custody 
informants during a pre-trial hearing to determine the reliability of the 
testimony before it is received in a capital trial.  Requiring a trial judge to 
concur with a jury’s determination that a death sentence is appropriate; or, if 
not, sentence the defendant to natural life.
Press Release, Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment, Illinois Commission Announces 
Nation’s Most Comprehensive Death Penalty Review, Recommends Sweeping Changes to 
Protect Innocent, Ensure Fairness (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=1&did=382.
173 See generally David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the 
Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 
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state’s death penalty regime was undermining, rather than promoting, the 
retributivist commitment to equal liberty under law.174  Senator Lieberman 
rightly noted that the credibility of the justice system is crucial, but, as I’ve 
observed earlier, we cannot disclaim responsibility for the prevailing reality that 
death sentences in Illinois (and elsewhere) are distributed quite arbitrarily, 
influenced unduly by factors like geography and the race of the victim.175  Far 
from widening the credibility gap, Ryan’s commutations helped reduce the 
sense that the state is blind to how arbitrary factors affect the distribution of 
capital punishment.176
One might respond as Garvey did, and argue that the remedy of the 
blanket commutation of death row was not the only appropriate retributivist 
response to the credibility gap.177  One could also choose to reduce that 
credibility gap by executing more of the offenders in the “geographically 
privileged” districts or more of the offenders whose victims were black.178  This 
alternative remedy is not so easily administered, however, so long as the 
recommendations to execute are made by decision makers from around the state 
whose views about the propriety of capital punishment vary by race and 
geography.  Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court’s prohibition on mandatory 
capital punishment for certain classes of offenders,179 the leveling down of 
punishment, instead of the leveling up, may have been the only effective way to 
respond to the disparities associated with the administration of the death penalty.  
Still, a critic might say, had a case-by- case review been undertaken, 
Ryan’s office could have explored whether geographical or racial issues played 
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject: 
Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1337 n.8 (2002) 
(collecting sources on “gross geographic variations in death sentence imposition rates both 
between and within death penalty jurisdictions”).
174
 One might say that disparities based on geographic reasons are not completely arbitrary.  
Geography, after all, can track the bounds of communities that have reached different 
agreements on the severity of punishments and crimes.  Two issues arise in response. to this 
argument.  First, what is the relevant political community?  In the context of assessing the 
stateState of Illinois’ imposition of capital punishment, as opposed to Cook County’s municipal 
rules and laws, it is fair to say that state laws should be applied in an even-handed manner across 
the state.  Second, some might say that racial or ethnic differences also track the boundaries of 
communities.  If blacks in Cook County do not want to impose the death penalty against other 
blacks, notwithstanding that the race of the victim was black too, should that matter?  To my 
mind, when assessing the legitimacy of a particular law or legal practice, one has to look at 
where that law comes from and assess its problems in light of the reach that that law is supposed 
to have.  If the State of Illinois has the death penalty, and if it is important that we have a popular 
voice in the form of a jury that decides whether that penalty is imposed, then, at least in the most 
serious cases, the jury should be drawn from a statewide pool, rather than a local one.  
175
 Another significant problem in capital cases is that defendants in capital cases often have 
inadequate legal representation.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death 
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
176
 To be sure, the “credibility” gap in the criminal justice system persists primarily as a 
consequence of the disparities in legal resources available to members of different socio-
economic classes.  Nonetheless, some might argue that the unequal distribution of a penalty does 
not speak to its being unjust or immoral.  See Ernest van den Haag, supra note 72, at 1663 (“[I]f 
the death penalty were imposed on guilty blacks, but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed 
by a lottery among the guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would 
neither make the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly punished, despite the undue 
impunity bestowed on others.”).  This claim is untenable once we have situated the practice of 
punishment in political society.  Van den Haag’s argument is inconsistent with thinking about 
pun ishment as a political and legal institution faithful to liberalism’s requirements, which 
include particularly a commitment to equal justice under law.  Van den Haag’s problem is that 
he fails to see the fundamental relationship between justice and equality described in Part III, 
supra.
177 See Garvey, supra note 2 passim.
178
 Ironically, this could, given the empirical reality that blacks kill blacks more than whites kill 
blacks, cause more blacks to be executed, not fewer.  See Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. 
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1394 
(1988).  
179
 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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a possible role in the decision to execute each particular offender.  Case-by- case 
review might have revealed at least one white death row offender whose victim 
was black and who was tried and sentenced to death in an “anti-death penalty” 
county.  In such a situation, the credibility gap problem could not arise (unless 
for other reasons aside from race or geography).  Executing that offender (or that 
class of offenders) would not be wrong, at least based on the arbitrariness 
critique.  Or would it?  If it appeared that the imposition of the death penalty 
was confined to such narrow conditions, then it would look--somewhat 
perversely--as though the state “values” the loss of black lives to murder more 
than it does the loss of non-black lives to murder.  That too would appear 
morally arbitrary across persons.  
What about the accuracy objections?  Presumably, one could also try to 
ameliorate the anxieties about accuracy through case-by- case review, under an 
evidentiary standard of moral certainty, as opposed to “merely” beyond a 
reasonable doubt.180  This route seems tempting as a criticism of the blanket 
commutation, but it should be resisted.  For often, what seems morally certain 
will depend upon facts as we know them at a given time.  These facts sometimes 
turn out to be quite shaky.181
A recent news item illustrates the problem in its full depth.  A police 
laboratory in Houston, which sits in Harris County, was recently accused of 
having provided false DNA evidence about thousands of crimes over the last 
twenty-five years.182  What is more, over seventy people have been executed for 
crimes in Harris County since the death penalty was reinstated in Texas in 
1976.183  We do not yet know how many people have been wrongfully convicted 
as a result of the incompetence or malfeasance in this lab.  But what might have 
seemed a moral certainty to a scrupulous and searching jury during these last 
twenty-five years could easily change if the factual predicate for that certainty is 
faulty.  The problem with the police lab in Harris County is especially 
disconcerting because DNA evidence lends an appearance of scientific certainty 
to convictions obtained through its use.
A blanket commutation of death row recognizes the intractable fallibility 
of our institutions in a way in which case-by- case review cannot.184  For 
although the culpability of an offender is decided case-by- case, he is still 
entitled to a system that determines that culpability accurately and fairly.185  In 
other words, even “if all 171 Illinois death row inmates were, in fact guilty, that 
did not mean that the broken system’s decision that they should die was one 
worthy of trust.”186
Moreover, a defense of case-by- case review cannot gain traction by 
180 See Tim Petrowich, Garnati Pleads with Senate to Vote Down Death Penalty Bill, MARION 
DAILY REPUBLICAN, Mar. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.mariondaily.com/articles/2005/03/19/local_news/news01.txt (discussing new bill in 
Illinois that would change the standard of proof to “without any doubt” from “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”) (last visited Mar. 21, 2005).
181 See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED  (2000); Marshall, supra note 33, at 574 - 75 
(“When DNA teaches us lessons about the incidence of eyewitness error or false confessions, 
those lessons are not limited to DNA cases.  The lessons apply with equal force to cases that are 
not susceptible to forensic testing.”).
182
 Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Crime Testing in Houston Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A19.
183 Id.
184 Cf. Michael Rowan, Minding Our Skepticism: A Conservative Approach to Capital 
Punishment, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 377, 405 - 407 (2003) (articulating the paradox that while 
conservatives favor limited and small government out of skepticism of government’s 
capabilities, many nonetheless support the death penalty notwithstanding the significance and 
finality of that decision).
185
 Of course, this recognition of fallibility affects all other punishments, which is why the state 
should punish in such a way as to create possible avenues for the state to apologize and 
compensate those convicted erroneously.
186 See Marshall, supra note 33, at 579.
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pointing to the DNA exonerations prior to Ryan’s blanket commutation as proof 
that the system works.  That is because, as Professor Marshall explains, we 
are not able to inspect all convictions in the same manner 
that we can inspect convictions susceptible to DNA 
corroboration or refutation.  Instead, we must treat the 
DNA cases as the equivalent of a random sampling of 
convictions and recognize that the error rate this sampling 
reveals, and the nature of errors it reveals, replicates the 
general error rate and sources of error among all cases.187
The evidence before Ryan indicated that there was no basis to conclude 
that the state was reliably imposing death sentences on the right people for the 
right reasons.  Hence, until the problems of sorting errors could be ameliorated, 
it was not unreasonable to prevent the state from making future sorting errors.  
Garvey’s retort is that case-by- case review would reveal whether someone might 
not have committed the crime.188  What the evidence shows, however, is that 
epistemic certainty will not be ours so long as human beings mistakenly 
remember, falsely testify, or incompetently handle DNA evidence in those few 
cases where DNA evidence exists.  We cannot forget that the people who were 
exonerated on death row were already proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In some of the cases, the courts had pronounced that the evidence implicating 
the defendant was overwhelming.  And then they were exonerated.189  Assuming 
arguendo that some people do deserve execution for their crimes, Garvey’s 
contention that case-by- case review would be the solution more consonant with 
mercy as equity misses the point.  
What the experience in Illinois reveals is that all criminal prosecutions 
potentially leave us wondering whether we might plausibly have missed 
something.  As I explain below, that does not mean we abandon all punishment, 
but it does entail that we punish with modesty about our capabilities, and that we 
punish, to the extent possible, in ways that permit social contrition for wrongs 
the state commits against the erroneously convicted. 
This does not end the inquiry of course, because some people might say 
that even with an error rate greater than zero, the death penalty’s benefits 
outweigh its not insubstantial costs.  A purist might say that a risk of error is too 
much to bear.  But, as I explain below, a retributivist has to consider the 
possibility that the death penalty may reduce incidents where we punish the 
innocent by mistake.  Second, we have to consider what impact, if any, our 
saving innocent lives should have on our punishment choices.  The merits of 
these contentions I take up in Part V.  But before doing so, I want to address the 
notion that Ryan’s actions were wrong from a retributivist perspective because 
they showed disrespect to the interests of victims. 
C. How Victims Matter, and How They Do Not
The third challenge to the blanket commutation of death row was 
predicated on the allegedly grievous injury that Ryan’s actions imposed on 
victims or survivors.  Without appearing insensitive, I want to stress that, from 
the perspective of retributive theory, and specifically the vantage point of the 
187 Id. at 578.
188 See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1329.
189 See Marshall, supra note 33, at 578 (“[I]t turned out--often through a series of miracles that 
never could have been anticipated by examining the paper record--that the defendant was 
innocent. To be sure, proponents of the commutations agreed, most of those on death row were 
guilty, but it was equally certain that some were innocent.  Some were still waiting for their 
miracle to come.  The problem was identifying which were which, and given the impossibility of 
doing that accurately, death sentences should be taken off the table.”).
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CCR, this injury has little to do with the demands of retributive justice properly 
understood.  
Victims have a place in retributive theory because their status as victims 
of a norm violation helps explain why in fact we punish offenders.190  But what 
justifies retributive punishment is the existence of a norm violation, not the 
existence of a specific victim.191  It is both common and commendable that 
institutions of retributive justice impose punishment for crimes that do not harm 
specific victims.192
What role then do victims play in determining sentencing outcomes in a 
retributivist scheme?  The short answer is none.  This is hardly a popular 
answer.  Because of the exalted position victims and survivors have come to 
occupy in contemporary American culture,193 there appears to be a political 
hesitation to discount their preferences.194  No one wants to be deemed callous 
to the pain of victims or their survivors.195  But over-sensitivity to their rage or 
grief qua victims creates the risk of losing the distinction between retribution 
and revenge.196  To the extent this is true, we must be careful because the claims 
of victims as victims are of little retributive significance.  As I highlighted in 
Part III, retribution does not speak in the name of victims alone; rather it speaks 
in the name of victims, among others, as citizens.  On this point, retributivists 
share an affinity with the great punishment theorist, Cesare Beccaria, who 
centuries ago wrote, “the right to inflict punishment is a right not of an 
individual, but of all citizens, or of their sovereign.”197  Or, as Robert Nozick 
wrote, a “victim occupies the unhappy special position of victim and is owed 
190
 By “victims” I also include their survivors.
191 See Michael S. Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 65, 69 (1999).   
192
 Think of self-exculpatory perjury by a defendant on trial for a minor regulatory crime, such as 
eating food on the subway.  The perjury has no specific victim, but it is wrong nonetheless; 
eating food on the subway may not be offensive but it can impose harms that one may 
reasonably aim to reduce through criminal sanction, such as injuries sustained by persons who 
slip on banana peels or increased costs of maintenance.  The CCR permits conduct of this sort to 
be sanctioned.  
This is one of the areas where my account of punishment may differ from retributivists 
like Michael Moore, who argues that the “norms of any criminal code that could satisfy the 
demands of retributive punishment have to match closely in content the central norms of 
morality.  If there is no such match, then there is no point to punishment, for a retributivist.”  See
id. at 69; see also Mundle, supra note 89, at 227 (“Punishment of a person by the State is 
morally justifiable, if and only if he has done something which is both a legal and moral offence 
. . . .”).  By contrast, I am prepared to give a mite more breathing space to the legislature to 
develop strange (though not illiberal) laws.  
193 See Jonathan Simon, Fearless Speech in the Killing State: The Power of Capital Crime 
Victim Speech, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1377 (2004) (describing the political power of victim 
organizations and victim speech).
194
 Of course these preferences are not hegemonically uniform either.  As Professor Bandes 
notes, “different victims have different needs” and these needs change over time and place.  
Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance, and the Role of the 
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1602 - 03 (2000).  Thus, the death penalty may not 
be the appropriate way to satisfy all victims’ preferences.
195 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 33, at 582 (“No caring person can be unmoved by the plight of 
murder victims’ families.”).
196 See Sarat, supra note 69, at 1350 - 55 (contrasting retributive theories with victim-centered 
understandings of punishment); Simon, supra note 193, at 1381 (“Victim speech also pushes the 
capital sentencing process away from classical and modern goals of criminal law like deterrence 
and retribution, and toward an embrace of vengeance.”); see also Susan Bandes, Empathy, 
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 365 (1996) (arguing that 
victim impact statements should be suppressed because they “appeal to hatred, the desire for 
undifferentiated vengeance, and even bigotry”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem 
with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 18 (2000).  On the topic of victim 
rights generally, see MARKUS DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS (2002); GEORGE FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995).
197 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 58 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill 
1963) (1764).
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compensation, [but] he is not owed punishment.”198
That said, let me add a series of qualifications.  First, there is nothing 
improper about the retributive state’s solicitousness toward victim interests 
where there is no conflict with principles of retributive justice.199  Indeed, the
participation of victims or their allies is often necessary to obtain a conviction.  
For that reason, there is nothing wrong with conferring upon victims a right to 
be informed about the timing of important criminal justice proceedings 
involving the prosecution of the offender.  Similarly, a victim should have the 
option of being present at those proceedings, with few exceptions.200  Indeed, 
victims of crime may, under certain circumstances, be due some form of social 
insurance to help them recover from their crimes, not to mention some form of 
restitution from the offender when available and appropriate. 
Still, the state need not and ought not be so solicitous to victims that it 
sacrifices its commitment to equal justice under law.201  A balance must be 
struck here.  The most difficult issue concerns not the right to be informed, or 
the right to be present, but the right to be heard.  As former victims’ advocate, 
and now District Court Judge, Paul Cassell has observed, a victim’s input into a 
decision for release or bail often proves vital to the imposition of correct release 
conditions.202  Similarly, when a judge makes her decision whether to reject a 
plea agreement because it is not in the interest of justice, she should be able to 
consider facts or issues raised by the victim, since prosecutors often engage in 
the practices of fact and charge bargaining.203  But the defendant should be able 
to respond and/or object to any statements of facts that the victim may seek to 
introduce if the effect is to increase the sentence.204  This process promotes 
greater truth-telling in criminal adjudications, which is vital because prosecutors 
and defendants sometimes have motivations that are not aligned with the 
interests of the court or society.205
198 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 138 (1974).
199
 One can easily imagine that some survivors and victims are untinctured by vengeance.  They 
simply but urgently want to see impartial retributive justice done to the offenders.  And for those 
victims, there are calm and deliberative ways of advancing their interests in the criminal justice 
system without debasing the quality of justice meted out.  See generally Paul G. Cassell, 
Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case For and the Effects of Utah’s Victim Rights 
Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373 (outlining such methods).         
200
 Obviously, if a victim is disruptive to the trial, then exclusion is warranted.  The more 
difficult situation arises when the victim is also a witness.  Generally, witnesses may not, absent 
the consent of both parties, sit through a trial and hear testimony of other witnesses, out of fear 
that the other testimony will unduly influence the testimony of the witness in question.  Even if 
both parties consent, the court may on its own motion exclude the witness from presence at the 
trial.  See FED. R. EVID. 615.  One way to deal with this problem is to require victim-witnesses 
who wish to stay for the whole trial to testify first, and to exclude them from the courtroom 
during the opening statements.  Compare that idea with Cassell, supra note 199, at 1392 
(defending amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 615 giving victims an “absolute right to 
attend trial, provided that the prosecutor agrees”).
201 Cf. John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 102 - 03 
(1999) (“Any practice of giving victims some role in criminal proceedings other than as 
witnesses, amongst other witnesses, to the fact of the offense must be highly questionable.”); 
Moore, supra note 191, at 67 (taking the extreme position that victims “should and must be 
ignored if you are claiming to be doing retributive theory”).  Moore goes too far, and, to a 
degree, so does Finnis; as I explain in the text, paying attention to victims in some instances may 
be necessary for proper retribution to be imposed. 
202
 Cassell, supra note 199, at 1394.
203 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 272, 278 - 79 (D. Mass. 2004) (Young, 
C.J.).  
204 Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537 (2004).  Blakely prohibits judges from 
finding facts that would increase a defendant’s sentence above the sentence he would receive 
based on the facts proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant admitted 
those facts or the fact was a prior conviction.
205
 While the interests of victims may not be aligned with the interests of the court, the increased 
availability of information makes it more likely that a court can come to a wise decision.  See
Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 265 (identifying the ways in which the prevailing criminal justice 
system, in particular its over-reliance on plea bargains, distorts incentives to tell the truth about 
what happened).
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned role, most retributivists would 
demur at lending victims a direct role in sentencing, say, by permitting a victim 
impact statement to be read prior to sentencing.206  The concern is that the judge 
or jury would be swayed to harshness or leniency as a result,207 and the problem 
with that, from a retributive perspective, is the disruption of the equality norm.  
Specifically, if victims or their survivors have a role that directly influences 
sentences, then the sentence that an offender receives may hinge on whether the 
jury finds the victim or his allies persuasive or sympathetic.208  Just as one 
victim’s family may urge especial harshness against an offender, another victim 
may be surpassingly compassionate, in which case the offender may receive an 
unwarranted request for no punishment or unusually lenient punishment.  This 
advantages him as compared to similarly situated offenders who committed the 
same offense.209
Again, I don’t want to overstate the irrelevance of victims to an attractive 
system of criminal justice.  Indeed, in some ways we could better effectuate the 
CCR’s moral accountability norm through victim participation.  For instance, 
victims or survivors could read to the court--after the sentence is imposed--an 
appropriate statement about how the crime has affected their lives.210  This 
would be especially appropriate in the vast majority of cases where offenders 
“accept responsibility” and enter a plea agreement.211  How effective such a 
statement would be when an offender adamantly insists upon his innocence is a 
different matter.  But post-sentencing victim statements could help achieve 
206
 Judge Cassell, for example, believes that victims have a right to be heard at sentencing.  See 
Cassell, supra note 199, at 1394.  As I explain in the text, this proposal goes too far, for some of 
the reasons sketched out by, among others, Jeffrie Murphy.  See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, supra note 
27, at 30.  Elsewhere, Murphy sought to give victims a greater role in sentencing determinations.  
See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of the Victim, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
209 (1990). This was rejected as being inconsistent with retributivism by both Fletcher and 
Moore.  See George P. Fletcher, The Place for Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 51 (1999); Moore, supra note 191, at 67.
207 See MURPHY, supra note 27, at 30 (seeing danger in allowing victim impact statements to 
play a legal role); Moore, supra note 191, at 67.  The Supreme Court initially blocked the use of 
victim impact statements in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), but four years later 
reversed course in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
208
 These persuasion skills can be subtle, and perhaps even unintentional.  If a victim has a 
different background from that of the offender, but shares a racial background with members of 
the jury or the judge, feelings of ethnic “solidarity” may influence the outcome.  There is much 
that has been written on these disparities and the bizarre results that may follow.  See generally
Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 517 (2000); Wayne A. Logan, Through the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and 
Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 143 (1999) [hereinafter 
Logan, Through the Past Darkly].
209
 It is true that there are other factors in play, such as the prosecutor’s wide discretion to seek 
the death penalty.  However, that discretion can be constrained in large measure because the 
prosecutor is a repeat player subject to carrots and sticks;  jurors or victims are usually one-off 
players, and are therefore less suspectible to having their discretion canalized along some 
principled basis.  See Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 16, at 1428.
210
 I am grateful to David Hoffman for a conversation that spurred this idea.  It turns out that 
post-sentence allocutions have been used sparingly in the past.  As of 1995, only Texas allowed 
post-sentence victim allocutions.  See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03, § 1(b) (Vernon 
1995) (detailing requirements for post-sentence victim allocution).  According to one 
commentator, the results of post-sentence victim allocutions do not invariably comport with the 
norms of an attractive justice system; in some cases, post-sentence statements have simply been 
opportunities for the families of victims to pile insult and invective on the offender.  See Keith 
D. Nicholson, Comment, Would You Like More Salt with That Wound? Post-Sentence Victim 
Allocution in Texas, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1103 (1995).  Nicholson wisely observes that judges 
should be empowered to hold in contempt those survivors whose statements violate the decorum 
of the courtroom.  Id. at 1143.  
211
 Defendants in the federal criminal system can be awarded a minor reduction in their sentence 
for “accepting responsibility” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  Prior to the 
Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), which rendered the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory, this reduction had been granted primarily to defendants 
who pleaded guilty.  Whether courts will grant more frequent or sharper reductions for accepting 
responsibility after Booker remains to be seen..
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greater incidence of contrition or remorse.212
In the context of the death penalty, the fear of victim influence on 
sentencing looms even more menacingly.  Thus, George Will’s critique--that 
Ryan’s actions were unjustifiable as a laceration of victim wounds--is off the 
mark at least as a retributivist critique because Will and those who share his 
views unduly privilege the victims or their families over the potentially wrongly 
executed.213  Ex ante--that is, knowing only the relevant risks and information, 
but not one’s possible identity as offender, victim, taxpayer, bystander, etc.--
reasonable persons should sooner authorize the elimination of the risk of being 
wrongly executed than the risk of being wrongly denied whatever closure that 
might be gained from the death of the offender.214
Undoubtedly, it is better that victims or survivors not be re-traumatized 
and that they find the psychological healing they need.  A good state and the rich 
panoply of societal institutions within it should make this therapy available to 
the extent possible.215  But it is purely speculative–-if not illusory–-to assert that 
the death or cruel punishment of the offender will necessarily achieve that 
healing, or that other means will not provide the closure victims seek.216  Indeed, 
there “is no evidence that families of murder victims in non-death states such as 
Michigan or Wisconsin endure more lasting pain than families of murder 
victims in death states such as Texas or Ohio.”217  In other words, the death 
penalty is not a means narrowly tailored to satisfy the state’s legitimate end of 
healing the wounds of crime victims.  Moreover, to the extent that victims 
participate in the decision to impose the death penalty, and to the extent the 
death penalty is imposed because of the positive personal characteristics of the 
victim or the economic and social dislocations caused by a particular victim’s 
death, then the imposition of death will be distributed on the basis of morally 
immaterial features of the victim or her family.218  Thus, the use of victim 
212
 On remorse and apology in criminal procedure, see Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. 
Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 
(2004).
213 See Will, supra note 4, at B7.
214
 I explained the relationship between ex ante decision-making and retributivist thought in Part 
III.D and note 114, supra.  The decision-making theory I have in mind does not call for 
aggregating utilities (through revealed preferences) from the ex ante position, but rather 
choosing the rule or practice that will most likely conduce to human flourishing from the 
perspective of a wise, liberal “ideal observer.”
215
 Indeed, in a speech delivered before he left office, Governor Ryan called for better 
deployment of social resources to provide counsel and help to victims and their families.  See
Ryan, supra note 42.
216
 Indeed, notwithstanding the number of surviving families upset by Ryan’s commutations, 
many members of victims’ groups, such as Parents of Murdered Children, are banding together 
to express their opposition to the death penalty.  One website reports that victims’ families often 
feel that no sentence can ever “equate to the loss of your child’s life and the horrors of murder.”  
THE RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR. FOR REFORM JUDAISM, DEATH PENALTY, at 
http://rac.org/advocacy/issues/issued (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).  Frequently, victims’ families 
recognize that the death penalty will inflict the same pain they have felt on the accused’s family.  
As one mother replied when asked at the funeral of her murdered son whether she wanted the 
death penalty:  “No, there’s been enough killing.”  Id.  See also MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES 
FOR RECONCILIATION, ABOUT MVFR, at http://www.mvfr.org/AboutMVFR.htm (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2005).
217
 Marshall, supra note 33, at 582.  Marshall also astutely observes:
[O]nly two percent of all murders are punished with the death penalty, even in 
death penalty states.  If we really believed that executions were essential to the 
well-being of victims’ families, how could we betray these other ninety-eight 
percent of families by depriving them of healing?  Not one study of which I 
am aware has ever found that the psychological health of families in cases in 
which executions have been imposed is better than in cases in which life 
sentences are imposed.
Id. at 582 - 83.  Similarly, I have seen no evidence that shows that the families of victims from 
nations where the death penalty is imposed heal at a greater rate than those who live in places 
that do not utilize capital punishment.
218
 I am grateful to Wayne Logan for highlighting this point to me.  Logan expands on this point 
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impact evidence undercuts the retributivist commitment to the fair and equal 
application of criminal sanctions.
In sum, from the perspective of the CCR (and other leading accounts of 
retributivism), the preferences of victims or their survivors should not enjoy 
special consideration in determining the death (or life) of the offender.  Thus the 
lack of consultation by Governor Ryan to the victims and/or their families 
before the commutation is of little weight, at least from a retributivist 
perspective.219
V. RETRIBUTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY
In this Part, I explore how and whether the arguments already discussed 
in Part IV create or shape a broader argument against the death penalty-- one 
that goes beyond the institutional questions of the legitimacy of Ryan’s 
commutation of death row.  In this Part, I aim beyond the commutation itself, 
and elaborate instead upon the general claim that retributivism and the death 
penalty are incompatible.
My goal here is to dispel the notion that retributivists must support the 
death penalty.220  In what follows, I offer and examine various arguments that 
militate against the death penalty from a retributivist perspective and then I 
explore what objections can be made to those arguments.  I conclude that there 
are no compelling retributivist defenses of execution, several compelling 
arguments against execution, and no evidence of a compelling deterrence-based 
justification to change course.221
In this respect, I move beyond a justification of the commutation of 
death row, and map out the topography of what I see as the retributivist case 
against the death penalty.  The concerns arising from the institutional application 
of the death penalty, from the perspective of the CCR, can be sorted into roughly 
two categories--contingent objections and conceptual objections.
A. Contingent Retributivist Objections to Executions
As seen earlier, a concern with accuracy and the desire to avoid 
arbitrariness in the distribution of the death penalty are core commitments of a 
liberal legal conception of retributivism.  If the death penalty is distributed 
arbitrarily, as was the case in Illinois, the agents who impose it act without 
legitimacy, for they transgress the bounded use of power that itself permits their 
use of coercion over others.  As the report from the Governor’s Commission on 
Capital Punishment showed, many offenders sentenced to death row were there 
because morally irrelevant factors such as race and intrastate geography played a 
in Logan, Through The Past Darkly, supra note 208, at 159.
219
 The claim that Ryan was callous towards victims seems untrue for at least two reasons.  First, 
Ryan’s rhetorical defense of his actions recognized the significance of victims and their interests.  
More importantly, he held hearings about what to do regarding the death penalty at which 
victims were given an opportunity to come forward and be heard.  See Sarat, supra note 69, at 
1367; Simon, supra note 193, at 1380.
220
 Kant and Professors Berns and Blecker are supporters of executions by virtue of their 
ostensibly retributivist commitments. See Berns, supra note 27; Blecker, supra note 72.  Even 
today, the Supreme Court continues to rely upon ideas of retribution to permit the imposition of 
the death penalty.  See sources cited supra note 73.  Furthermore, considering the particularly 
heinous crimes of which many of the offenders on Illinois’ death row were convicted, many 
people believe firmly that these “worst of the worst” deserve execution.
221
 Of course, there is an ongoing debate about the death penalty’s deterrent power, but there has 
been little proof of a marginal deterrent effect.  See Marshall, supra note 33, at 582; Bedau, 
supra note 122, at 39.  
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major part in their sentencing.222  That objection, it seems, does not itself call for 
an end to the death penalty--only a more even-handed imposition of it.  As a 
legal matter, however, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the death penalty 
may preclude a more even-handed imposition of it, in which case the leveling 
down of punishment is the only route available.223
A more powerful objection to the imposition of the death penalty is the 
problem of inaccuracy, as discussed above.  Various empirical studies have 
shown that there is a high error rate associated with death-penalty eligible 
cases.224  Some of these errors are uncovered prior to the execution of the 
offender.225  Some, lamentably, are not.226
These arguments may not quell the concerns of Blecker and Garvey, 
among others, who suggest that case-by- case review could have shown that at 
least one of the people on death row did in fact commit the crime he was 
convicted of and was not arbitrarily sentenced to death on the basis of the race 
of the victim or the county in which he was prosecuted.227  My answer, perhaps 
unsatisfactory to some, is to deny, at the level of institutional decision-making, 
Garvey’s premise that we could achieve the certainty we need to make the 
decision to kill someone.  Because of the finality of a sorting error, one is 
properly wary of inflicting the death penalty before it is too late to correct the 
error.  
Other reasons may also warrant consideration.  For instance, as stated 
before, the retributivist social planner cannot deny responsibility for the 
predictable (if unintended) deleterious effects of their actions.  Hence, there is an 
obligation to consider the well-being of the citizens who serve as the state’s 
executioners.  Many of these executioners, and the teams that assist them, suffer 
from extensive psychological traumas and associated medical difficulties.228
222 Cf. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 160 at 
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/chapter_01.pdf.
223 See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding mandatory death penalty scheme for 
individuals convicted of capital crimes while already serving life sentences unconstitutional); 
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (striking down a mandatory death penalty scheme). 
224 See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973 -
1995, at 1 (2000), available at 
http://justiceccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/liebman2.pdf.finrep.pdf.  Strikingly, Liebman’s 
study found that courts reverse capital convictions and/or sentences at an average rate of sixty-
eight percent.  See James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 
1973 - 1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000).
225
 As Garvey noted, at the time of Ryan’s decision, thirteen offenders on death row in Illinois 
had been exonerated, while twelve had been executed. See Garvey, supra note 2, at 1320 n.4. 
Many others have been exonerated prior to their execution.  According to the Death Penalty 
Information Center, 119 people in twenty-five states have been released from death row since 
1973, due to evidence of their innocence.  See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., INNOCENCE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6?. (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2005).  The latest exoneration was Derrick Jamison of Ohio on February 28, 
2005.  Id. In light of the shoddy laboratory work allegedly conducted in Harris County, Texas, 
however, the number of wrongly executed may go up, pending the results of the investigation.  
See Liptack & Blumenthal, supra note 182, at A19.
226
 To date, much research has explored how many offenders have been wrongfully executed.  
One study by the Equal Justice Institute USA has found evidence that, by 2000, at least sixteen 
people were executed for crimes they did not commit. See GRASSROOTS INVESTIGATION
PROJECT, EQUAL JUSTICE USA, REASONABLE DOUBTS: IS THE U.S. EXECUTING INNOCENT 
PEOPLE? (Oct. 26, 2000), at 
http://www.quixote.org/ej/grip/reasonabledoubt/reasonabledoubt.pdf.  In addition to the 
possibility that wrongful execution may not be that uncommon, one must also consider that the 
lack of information on this subject is created by the fact that there exists little incentive for 
people to investigate the innocence of people who are already dead.  As between the choice to 
spend time clearing the name of someone who has not yet been executed and that of someone 
who has been executed, people will tend to choose the former.
227
 Blecker, supra note 8, at 304 (condemning the morally indiscriminate process); Garvey, 
supra note 2, at 1322; see also Louis P. Pojman, Why the Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible, 
in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 122, at 72.
228 See Bob Herbert, Inside the Death House, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at A21 (describing the 
trauma of the Texan executioners in dealing with their jobs on the “tie-down” team); Witness to 
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That problem, coupled with the fact that many executions are botched,229
counsels restraint.  
Together or on their own, these three criticisms of the death penalty 
provide a justification for a blanket commutation of death row sentences on 
retributivist grounds--at least temporarily.  Arguably, however, these criticisms 
lose their force over time as the administration of justice is rationalized and 
improved.230
The interesting question, then, is what happens if these practical 
problems disappear: are there any conceptual objections to the death penalty 
from a retributive standpoint?  I think the answer is yes for several reasons.
B. Conceptual Retributivist Objections to Executions
1. Executions Prevent Internalization of CCR’s Animating Values
      By inflicting death on an offender, one violates the intent requirement of the 
CCR because one necessarily forecloses the opportunity to see the norms of 
retribution effectuated in the person’s behavior during and after the 
confrontational encounter.231  After the execution, the offender cannot conduct 
himself in a manner that affirms notions of moral responsibility or equal liberty 
under law; in other words, he is precluded from participating in the goods 
animating retributive justice.  
Here, it bears mentioning that retribution remains distinct from the 
rehabilitation of the individual offender.  Rehabilitation has traditionally, though 
not exclusively, been deemed a form of treatment, viewing criminality as a 
sickness, rather than as the product of a deliberate choice to undertake conduct 
that has been prohibited by the polity.  By viewing criminality as the product of 
an Execution, (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 20, 2000) (detailing the traumas of the execution 
teams in Texas) (transcript available at http://www.soundportraits.org/on-
air/witness_to_an_execution/transcript.php3).  One might argue that those working for the state 
in this capacity assume the risk of trauma.  ItHowever, even if these workers knew that their jobs 
involved grave tasks, it is not clear what, if any, risk premium these workers receive and 
ifwhether any of them were put on notice that these particular traumas comprised were a risk 
associated with the job, even if they knew that their job involved grave tasks..  Even if there 
were an assumption of risk that satisfiedincluded these conditions, the fact of such apparent 
consent doesis not work an automatic defense on behalf of the government.  There are some 
bargains the state may not strike, just as there are certain bargains an offender may not make.  
An offender is not permitted to murder someone even if he is willing to pay the assigned 
“damages” of his own life in exchange.  Similarly, the state may not give offenders the choice to 
amputate one of their limbs to forego prison or a chance to purchase their way out of a sentence 
imposed for raping someone.  See generally MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT (1993).   
229 See Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right To Be Retributive: Execution Methods, 
Culpability Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1099, 
1104 (2003) (detailing the horrors of botched executions leading to predictable and excruciating 
instances of pain inflicted on the offender and noting that about seven percent of executions are 
botched in any given year); see also Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less Than the Dignity of 
Man: Evolving Standards, Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing 
Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335 (2002 - 2003).
230
 One might argue that the death penalty may traumatize executioners even if it is fairly and 
painlessly applied.  But a willing state could quite plausibly evade this difficulty by, say, 
automating executions to absolve attendants of any overtly active responsibilities.  One might 
also note that the “pesthole” of the American prison, to use Jeffrie Murphy’s term, is hardly 
conducive to the spiritual well-being of prison guards. Jeffrie Murphy, Repentance, Punishment 
and Mercy, in REPENTANCE 143, 152 (Amitai Etzioni, ed., 1997); see generally TED CONOVER, 
NEWJACK: GUARDING SING SING (2000) (a memoir of a journalist who became a prison guard).  
I take this point as an argument for the dramatic need to reform and improve our current system 
of imprisonment.  In the conclusion of this Article, I suggest how these concerns impinge upon 
punishment in the non-capital context.   
231 See Gale, supra note 124, at 1032. 
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sickness rather than of free choice, a rehabilitative perspective arguably violates 
a person’s right to be punished for the choices he made as a dignity-bearing 
morally autonomous agent.  By contrast, retribution, as Professor Herbert Morris 
observed, respects a person’s right to be punished as an autonomous agent.232
Similarly, the goal of internalization is not, as Garvey would urge, the 
reconciliation between the offender and the victim--although such an event is 
not to be avoided or prevented.233  Rather, through its use of coercive 
confrontation, retributive punishment communicates certain fundamental norms.
And the communication is itself insufficient if the confrontational encounter 
fails to leave a chance for the offender to internalize and live by the ideals 
animating retribution (even if in a prison) during or after the encounter.234
With respect to this point, I acknowledge that there may be many 
offenders for whom internalization of these ideals holds no attraction.  
Nonetheless, the reason for this restriction on the mode of punishment is to 
avoid pointlessness.  In the way that an insult shouted to an offender in a 
language she does not understand is a pointless exercise, a punishment that 
leaves no opportunity for internalization grimly forecloses the reconstruction of 
the offender’s self as moral agent and as citizen.  To be sure, this goal would be 
of little concern to someone concerned solely with revenge.  However, revenge 
and retribution are different in salient ways, and this, I believe, is one of them. 
I recognize that the long period of time that often elapses between the 
conviction of an offender and the time of his eventual execution may weaken 
this argument.235  Offenders arguably have the time and opportunity to 
internalize the values animating the CCR while waiting on death row.  After all, 
as Samuel Johnson said, nothing concentrates the mind so wonderfully as the 
sight of the hanging gallows.236  But this reasoning is perverse, no?  Executions, 
232 See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 486 (1968) (“A person has a 
right to institutions that respect his choices.  Our punishment system does; our therapy system 
does not.”); see also HEGEL, supra note 109, at 126 (“The injury. . . which is inflicted on the 
criminal is not only just in itself (and since it is just, it is. . . his right); it is also a right for the 
criminal himself. . . .  For it is implicit in his action, as that of a rational being, that it is universal 
in character, and that, by performing it, he has set up a law which he has recognized for himself 
in his action, and under which he may therefore be subsumed as under his right.”)(original 
emphasis omitted).  Two other points bear mentioning about the distinction between 
rehabilitation and retribution.  First, rehabilitation, unlike retribution, could be sought in the 
absence of an actual offense.  See supra text accompanying note 126.  By contrast, to knowingly 
punish someone who has not committed an offense does not constitute punishment anymore.  It 
defies our sense of what that word means and requires the invention of another word, what 
Rawls called “telishment.”  See Rawls, supra note 124, at 11.  Second , a salient distinction 
between rehabilitation and retribution relates to who has a stronger claim to scarce social 
resources.  In a society where the expenditure of resources are always balanced against 
competing attractive social projects, one can see why the person who has not broken the social 
contract has a stronger moral claim to those scarce social resources than someone who has 
violated that public trust and covenant.  Of course, in considering prisoner re-entry to society, 
the polity may reasonably decide that investing in the skills of offenders is a worthwhile 
endeavor to reduce the social cost of recidivism and to undertake a form of democratic self-
defense and social self-protection.  That decision is made less for the benefit of the offender than 
it is for the good of society.
233
 In this respect, Garvey’s “punishment as atonement” thesis can in large measure be 
accommodated by the CCR.
234
 In conversation, my friend Matt Price cannily argued that the state may indeed communicate 
its reprobation of the offender at the point of execution, gesturing in the way that Kafka’s 
Harrow needle would inscribe upon the flesh the reason for the execution of a condemned 
prisoner as he was dying.  See Franz Kafka, In the Penal Colony, in THE METAMORPHOSIS, IN 
THE PENAL COLONY, AND OTHER STORIES 189 (Joachim Neugroschel trans., Scribner Paperback 
Fiction 1st ed. 1995) (1919).  Furthermore, because the execution takes time to occur, the 
offender understands the reprobation both prior to and during his execution.  To my mind, this 
objection fails for the reasons I state in the text.      
235
 For executions that occurred in 2003, the average amount of time spent on death row between 
sentence and execution was 131 months.  See Thomas B. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital 
Punishment, 2003, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Nov. 2004, at 11 (Table 11), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf.
236 See Mortality Quotes, THE SAMUEL JOHNSON SOUND BITE PAGE (“Depend upon it, sir, when 
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more likely than not, preclude opportunities for these moral norms to take root.  
During the time an offender is on death row, he constantly fears that today is the 
day death comes knocking, making it hard for him to actually lend much thought 
to the values animating retributive justice.237  It’s no wonder that W.C. Fields, in 
a movie where he played a wag about to be executed, quipped to his hangman 
that his execution will “sure be a lesson to me.”238
2. Executions Immodestly Prevent the State from Meaningfully Taking 
Responsibility for Its Mistaken or Wrongful Actions
The ultimately immodest nature of the imposition of the death penalty 
comprises a second conceptual difficulty for retributivists.  It flouts the 
retributivists’ desire to see the practice of punishment as a dignified use of 
coercion, a practice designed to communicate the ideals discussed in Part III.  
On this view, punishment has a moral aesthetic, and thus it must be meted out 
with the correct posture, a posture of modesty.  Accordingly, a posture of 
overweening confidence, which the death penalty necessarily entails because it 
acts with such finality,239 is inappropriate.  It is improper –- at the very least -– 
because of our fears about the possibility of the inaccurate infliction of the death 
penalty, discussed above.  Although retributivists affirm the significance of 
communicating the norm of moral responsibility through punishment, the 
continued anxiety about trying to avoid punishment of the innocent entails the 
view that one cannot fully comprehend all that surrounds us.  In other words, the 
concern for accuracy in distribution of punishment is fundamentally a 
retributivist concern that renders the death penalty deeply problematic as an 
institutional practice (even if in some cases we are not anxious about the 
accuracy because we really “know” we have the right person).240
This persistent uncertainty is vitally important because with most other 
forms of punishment the state itself can communicate and make plain its 
contrition for wrongs due to error or abuse, and it can do so in a way that can at 
least be appreciated by the person wrongly convicted.  When the guillotine 
drops, this opportunity is forfeited, for, at that point, the state cannot 
demonstrate its own sense of remorse to the offender, even if it could make 
some amends to the surviving family.241  A posture of modesty should thus be 
a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”) (quoting 
JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON), at
http://www.samueljohnson.com/mortalit.html#383 (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
237
 Over a century ago, the Supreme Court stated that “when a prisoner sentenced by a court to 
death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most 
horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the
whole of it.”  In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); see also Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 
(1995) (Stevens, J., mem. respecting denial of cert.); Gale, supra note 124, at 1032.
238 See Stephen C. Hicks, The Only Argument for Capital Punishment in Principle--A Frank 
Appraisal, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 333, 333 (1991) (“At the end of ‘My Little Chickadee,’ W. C. 
Fields’ character is about to be hanged.  He says, ‘it’ll sure be a lesson to me.’”).
239
 Strikingly, the issue of humility and hubris came up repeatedly in comments made by some 
death penalty supporters.  See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 69, at 1348 (reporting how State Senator 
Haine criticized Ryan’s actions as a “breathtaking act of arrogance”); Simon, supra note 193, at 
1404 - 08 (listing examples of victim reactions).
240 See Rawls, supra note 124, at 3 (distinguishing between the justification of a practice and the 
justification of a particular action falling under that practice).
241 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.  It is unique 
in its total irrevocability.”); Weisberg, supra note 7, at 1425 - 40; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584, 605 - 06 (2002); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991); Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).  I note, however, that the focus here 
on the death penalty’s faults should not be taken to imply that other forms of punishment are 
trouble-free.  The abusive and arbitrary use of coercive force in prisons and the misguided 
exercise of civil or criminal forfeiture or civil commitment are susceptible to critique, but they 
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implicit in all retributive punishments because quite simply, we may be wrong 
for reasons we cannot or will not discern until much later.242
One might try to bolster this argument further by insisting that the 
posture required to impose the death penalty is not merely one of immodesty.  
Rather, the cultural practice of executions has become, on many occasions, a 
ritual that devolves into a preening form of sanctimony such as those associated 
with shaming punishments, the same parade of ressentiment properly excoriated 
by Nietzsche.243
This extension of the aesthetic critique, however, cannot survive a claim 
that the improper posture is a conceptual necessity.  Notwithstanding historical 
experience to the contrary, an execution need not be a spectacle or an 
opportunity to lord oneself over the offender in self-righteousness.  It can be 
motivated by legitimate concerns about social self-protection and accompanied 
by rituals that convey a sense of hesitant hope that this really is the best thing to 
do, all things considered.  Still, as long as humans remain fallible and the specter 
of inaccuracy haunts our institutions, the earlier claim--that executions require 
an improper posture of immodesty because they prevent the state from 
apologizing to the offender for its wrongful treatment--persists as a justification 
for abolishing the death penalty at the institutional level.244
3. Executions Offend Human Dignity
Might it nonetheless make sense to preserve the death penalty for special 
cases?  Consider Jack, our offender from Part III.  Say Jack has committed a 
murder revealing unmitigated wickedness.  However, he has confessed to the 
crime, taken responsibility for his actions, apologized to his victim’s family, and 
feels guilty unto death, so much so that he would prefer to die at the hands of the 
state (rather than by his own hand) because he does not want to deprive the state 
of any deterrent benefits that might flow from his execution.  Under such an 
unusual scenario, what retributivist reasons remain not to execute him?  There is 
no necessary posture of immodesty or preening sanctimony because Jack has 
himself recognized his wrongdoing and told the state of his guilt.  Ex 
hypothesis, he has spent two years on death row, where he has focused on 
internalizing the meaning of moral accountability, equal liberty under law, and 
democratic self-defense.  Moreover, technology has made Jack’s execution 
possible without causing pain to Jack or psychological harm to his executioners.  
Under these circumstances, what retributivist reasons, if any, forbid the 
execution of Jack?  There are two possible answers.  The first has to do with the 
all brook the possibility that the state can reverse course, compensate, and apologize.  See also
AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION
16 (2001) (the finality of death penalty is at odds with the “spirit of openness, of reversibility, of 
revision” necessary for democratic politics); Logan, supra note 173, at 1347.
242
 It is for that reason, although not that reason alone, that retributivism voices opposition to 
shaming punishments as well.  See generally Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully 
Retributive?, supra note 16.
243 See NIETZSCHE, supra note 28.  Lately, this form of sanctimonious stigmatization has 
recrudesced in America.  See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(permitting shaming punishment as “rehabilitation”).
244
 One could respond and say that if the metric of punishment (P) is the product of 
responsibility (R) and the gravity of the wrongdoing (W), see NOZICK, supra note 133, at 366 -
68, then perhaps this discussion simply calls for raising the standard of proof needed to execute 
someone to beyond all doubt (C for certitude) and not just beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hence P 
= R*W*C.  Arguably, the C factor is built into our assessments of a person’s responsibility.  In 
any case, my friend Matt Price believes that this illustrates that perhaps retributivism is 
compatible with the death penalty in theory but not in practice because of our fallibility.  This 
argument, however, assumes that some people deserve death for their crimes and that the state 
should impose that death sentence.  These propositions are problematic, as I explain in the text.  
Moreover, implementing the death penalty necessarily undermines the opportunity for the 
offender’s internalization of the values animating retributive justice.
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institutional level at which the CCR operates; at that level, it is permissible for 
the legislature to assume that an offender like Jack probably does not exist.  But 
that answer may seem unsatisfying to critics like Professor Blecker or Senator 
Lieberman, who prefer case-by- case review, because the legislature can always 
create a law that gives discretion to a more “local” decision-maker to determine 
whether Jack exists in a specific case.  Hence, an appeal to the institutional 
nature of the CCR only permits a determination that retributivism would allow 
the abolition of execution.  It does not (yet) demonstrate that the abolition of 
execution is required under all circumstances.
The reason justice requires the categorical abolition of executions is 
because of the relationship between the CCR and the enduring, albeit enigmatic, 
concept of human dignity.245  That dignity is the exalted moral status that all 
human life possesses by virtue of human existence itself.  At least with respect 
to punishment, it is fair to define dignity as the value that attaches to human 
existence by virtue of the distinctly human capability for acting in accordance 
with autonomy and reason.246  Dignity plays at least three roles in criminal law: 
it helps explain what we punish, why we punish, and how we punish.  In terms 
of what we punish, we rely on dignity, in part, to explain that offenders should 
be punished for crimes even where the victims are unaware that they are victims.  
For example, if a gynecologist puts his patient in an unconscious state and rapes 
her, the gynecologist should still be liable for punishment even if the victim does 
not know she is a victim.247  In terms of why we punish, we do so out of respect 
for the dignity of an offender by regarding, under the right conditions, his 
actions as the product of autonomous moral choice.248  But sometimes autonomy 
245
 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[D]eath stands 
condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.”).
246
 I note here my own trouble with the meaning of dignity outside the context of punishment.  
Some thinkers embrace the (Kantian) view that human dignity is coextensive with a respect for 
autonomous personhood, which is itself interlaced with the human capacity for rationality.  See, 
e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE AND 
THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223, 227 (1979) (characterizing the Kantian 
view of dignity as a value “we respect when we address ourselves to [persons] in terms of their 
unique characters and acts (i.e. what those characters and acts deserve)”) (emphasis in original); 
Robert A. Pugsley, A Retributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1501, 1510 (1981) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
55 - 113).  Analytically, one can distinguish autonomy from rationality. What’s interesting is 
whether one can distinguish dignity from rational autonomy.  The foregoing description of 
dignity as requiring respect for rational autonomy seems to work fine in the context of 
punishment, but it poses a problem more generally because it seems too narrow.  With the 
Kantian view of dignity described above, one faces the puzzle of whether very young children 
and/or severely disabled persons possess human dignity and the protection it would afford.  In 
other words, to predicate dignity upon rational autonomy seems insufficient because we might 
reasonably insist that dignity attaches even to those humans whose capacity for rational thought 
has either not developed or been extinguished.  Cf. Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 
875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989) (addressing educational obligations to a young person who is 
multiply handicapped and profoundly mentally retarded, someone who suffers from complex 
developmental disabilities, spastic quadriplegia, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder and cortical 
blindness).  That person enjoys and possesses human dignity even though she or he is bereft of 
the capacity for rational thought or “the sense of justice” that John Rawls relied upon in 
describing the fount of human obligations of justice.  See John Rawls, The Sense of Justice, 72 
PHIL. REV. 281, 284 (1963) (“What qualifies a person as holding an original position so that in 
one’s dealings with him one is required to conduct oneself in accordance with principles that 
could be acknowledged by everyone from an initial position of equality?  The answer to this 
question . . . is that it is necessary and sufficient that he be capable, to a certain minimum degree, 
of a sense of justice.”).  In any event, tethering dignity to rational autonomy is not (normatively) 
problematic in the context of punishment because retributive punishment could never 
permissibly be imposed on someone lacking that “sense of justice.”  To punish someone who 
could not understand that he was being punished for something he did violates the retributivist 
criterion that offenders be competent throughout the confrontational encounter with the state. 
247 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88 CAL. L. REV. 759, 764 
(2000).  
248
 Here I am using dignity in the “troubled” sense I alluded to earlier, supra note 246, that is the 
concern for “autonomous human personhood” that Murphy isolates.
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and dignity diverge.  For instance, we ought not respect a person’s autonomous 
choice to become a slave, not because the choice can never be autonomous, but 
because the result of the choice is an affront to human dignity.249  Jack’s wish to 
be executed is an instance of that phenomenon.  Dignity is what we uphold 
when we say we do not let offender (and, in some cases, victim) preferences 
control.250  Because those preferences don’t control, it is worth thinking about 
the proposition that we ought to forbear from executions because we want to 
protect the dignity of the offender as well as that of the polity in whose name the 
punishment is imposed.251
That thinking about dignity places limits on how we punish.  For 
example, consider why we ought not torture offenders for even the most brutal 
crimes.  As Murphy trenchantly observes, “[s]ending painful voltage through a 
man’s testicles to which electrodes have been attached, or boiling him in oil . . . 
are not human ways of relating to another person.  [The offender] could not be 
expected to understand this while it goes on, have a view about it, enter into 
discourse about it, or conduct any other characteristically human activities 
during the process – a process whose very point is to reduce him to a terrified, 
defecating, urinating, screaming animal.”252  The reason torture is wrong helps 
explain why executions are wrong: it removes the possibility that punishment 
will comport with the respect for dignity qua autonomous personhood that 
animates (at least in part) retributive punishment.  
That failure of respect for human dignity degrades the offender and the 
punishing agent.  Thinking about the relationship between dignity and 
retribution this way helps explain retributive hostility to Abu Ghraib or to 
shaming punishments.253  Indeed the fact of a collective dignity explains why 
249 Id. at 771 - 72.  That’s why we abhor activities such as consensual dwarf-tossing.  See U.N. 
Backs ‘Dwarf-Tossing’ Ban, CNN.COM, Sept. 27, 2002, at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/27/dwarf.throwing.  And that’s why we 
properly recoil from needless cruelty.  It is possible that some would place dwarf-tossing in the 
category of sado-masochistic “play” among private parties, in which case the problem of dignity 
violations occurs when the state gets involved in matters that would be permissible if left in 
private hands.  Kent Greenawalt illustrates this nicely by distinguishing between a situation 
where a sex-crime offender is refused the punishment of castration in the name of protecting 
dignity and a situation where a person with perverse sexual urges preemptively seeks out 
castration to minimize his chances of undertaking sex crimes.  See Kent Greenawalt, Dignity and 
Victimhood, 88 CAL. L. REV. 779, 787 (2000).
250
 Of course, if our current prison system, and its attending brutalization, is the baseline against 
which we measure the cruelty of our punishments, one might fairly ask whether an offender 
should be permitted to choose between death and life without parole (or even forty years) in a 
supermax facility.  Consider Timothy McVeigh, who tired of appealing his conviction for 
involvement in the Oklahoma City bombing, and chose to waive appeals regarding his 
execution.  See McVeigh Execution: A ‘Completion of Justice’, CNN.COM, June 11, 2001, at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/11/mcveigh.02.  The response to this question is that 
offenders’ wishes regarding their punishments do not carry weight.  After all, most would prefer 
not to be punished at all.  The point of the CCR is that it is the experience of some substantial 
coercion that communicates the underlying values to the offender.  The more difficult question is 
how we create prisons that comport with the notion of human dignity.  Jim Whitman’s work on 
comparative criminal justice suggests some possible measures.  See WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, 
supra note 17.
251
 Murphy has criticized the suggestion that the dignity of the collective is diminished, arguing 
that the affront to human dignity, say from torture, arises because torture is an independent 
wrong upon a person, not because it disgraces the torturer or the public in whose name torture 
occurs.  MURPHY, supra note 246.  If there were no disgrace involved however, why would 
executioners in some traditions be hooded?  More basically, we can imagine certain practices 
that we might view as degrading of the public (e.g., eating dead ancestors who consent to having 
their corpses eaten) even though no person is specifically wronged by such actions.  In such a 
situation, one can offer the judgment that human dignity has been violated even though no 
independent wrong has been committed.  
252 MURPHY, supra note 246, at 233. 
253 See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 612 (9th Cir. 2004) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “public humiliation” has “no proper place in our system of justice”); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: SHAME, DISGUST AND THE LAW (2004); Markel, Are 
Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, supra note 16.  Abu Ghraib remains problematic 
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executioners (and often the executed) wear hoods--there is a horror and a 
disgrace involved.  Moreover, although not uniquely a democratic value, the 
idea of human dignity undergirds liberal democracy--the system of government 
in which political coercion can only be justified and exercised when consistent 
with respect for the free and equal nature of all human persons.  That notion of 
limited government is disturbed by the choice to conduct executions when less 
final, less irrevocable alternatives exist.  Indeed, as Austin Sarat observes, when 
democracies execute, and render its citizens complicit in capital punishment, 
that complicity “contradicts and diminishes the respect for the worth or dignity 
of all persons that is the enlivening value of democratic politics.”254  Because 
retributive justice, as I’ve sketched it out, is part of that democratic politics, so 
too is its rejection of the death penalty.
Opposition to the death penalty arises, then, not only because of our 
fundamental commitment to respect the basic dignity of the offender, 
notwithstanding his past offense,255 but also our own dignity.  The forgoing 
discussion illuminates how human dignity is a value whose strength in the moral 
life is more vividly experienced the more vigilant we are in protecting and 
nurturing it.256
C. Objections Considered
At this point, I want to raise and consider a series of objections and 
related responses to my arguments.  First, to the extent that my arguments 
against the death penalty rely upon the fact that executions differ from other 
punishments, it is useful to note the limitations of those differences.  For 
example, if someone is imprisoned for life without parole, and the state only 
discovers later, after he dies in prison, that he was factually innocent, then the 
opportunity for the state’s apology and reparation is also lost.  Indeed, someone 
innocent could be indicted, and then during his trial, he could die, never having 
cleared his name.  This situation presents a clear line-drawing problem. 257
One could draw the line elsewhere, of course, and simply give up on 
punishment altogether.  Retributivists (as much as anyone else) have to 
recognize that a system that is bound to err will predictably create conditions 
where some innocent persons will be swept up in the dragnet of the criminal 
justice system in pursuit of the goal of punishing the guilty.  The question then is 
where it makes sense to draw the line.  Due to the reasons I have already 
discussed above, it does not seem unreasonable to draw it at the death penalty.  
By precluding executions, at least there is a chance for error to be recognized, 
apologized for, and, in some cases, recompensed appropriately.258
not simply for what was done to humiliate the detainees, but also because of the denial of due 
process to ensure that only hostile enemies were detained.
254 SARAT, supra note 241, at 16 - 17.
255 See Pugsley, supra note 246, at 1510 - 16 (arguing from Kantian perspective that concern for 
dignity of offenders is difficult to reconcile with executions).
256
 I recognize that not everybody agrees that human dignity is necessarily degraded through 
execution.  Van den Haag, for example, observed that some philosophers, such as Kant and 
Hegel, might think “execution, when deserved, is required for the sake of the convict’s dignity.”  
Van den Haag, supra note 72, at 1669.  Nonetheless, one can insist that the claim that executions 
degrade human dignity is self-evident, while also acknowledging that its self-evidence is not 
apparent to everyone.  See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 32, 73 (1982) 
(explaining that a basic human good need not be universally recognized in order to be self-
evident).
257
 These problems abound.  Indeed, offenders who were on death row when Ryan was governor 
got a better deal (assuming life imprisonment without parole is better than execution) than those 
who were executed prior to or after his blanket commutation.
258
 Thus, the critique that “any time spent in prison . . . can never be returned to the prisoner,” 
Note, The Rhetoric of Difference and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1599, 1621 (2001), seems off-mark as a reason not to distinguish death from other onerous 
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Still, one might think my condemnation of the death penalty as an 
institutional practice is too hasty, for two kinds of reasons.  The first kind of 
reason has to do with deterrence issues, and the second has to do with possible 
retributivist reasons in favor of the death penalty, specifically those addressing 
moral desert, a topic that I have not yet adequately addressed. 
1. Death and Deterrence
Deterrence arguments may be of concern for retributivists for at least 
three reasons: preventing false accusations, ensuring inmate and officer safety, 
and saving innocent lives.  
Let’s begin with erroneous convictions.  On the account of retributivism 
I have provided, I have emphasized the importance of avoiding the state’s 
erroneous conviction of innocent individuals.  But what if the presence of the 
death penalty actually reduced the number of falsely accused persons who are 
mistakenly punished?  As I said before, in a system where error is inevitable, 
retributivists have to be mindful of the fact that they ineluctably “trade the 
welfare of the innocents who are punished by mistake for the . . . punishment of 
the guilty.”259  The death penalty debate highlights that problem because it is 
possible that if the death penalty exists, then fewer people are inclined to 
murder, which means that, on the margins, and assuming a constant rate of legal 
error, there would be fewer innocent people wrongfully swept up in the dragnet 
of law enforcement, prosecution, and punishment than if the death penalty did 
not exist.260  Creating the threat of execution in that situation could protect 
innocent people from punishment.  
I am prepared to accept this argument as a countervailing consideration 
internal to the account of retribution that I have provided.261  It would be 
improper for the state to obliviously choose punishment methods that increased 
the risk of erroneous convictions.  That choice would run afoul of the core 
maxim that the state cannot disclaim responsibility for the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of its actions, and that in the modern regulatory state 
the act/omission distinction is of virtually no moral significance.262  I should 
add, however, that I have seen no evidence that the numbers of erroneous 
punishments.  .  It is true that lost time cannot itself be restored, but that does not preclude civil 
plaintiffs from obtaining a remedy in tort for harms endured on account of false imprisonment, 
nor does it mean that a victim of false imprisonment, or her allies and survivors, would not 
appreciate the expression of apology and recompense from the state.
259
 George Schedler, Can Retributivists Support Legal Punishment?, 63 MONIST 185, 189 
(1980); see also Dolinko, supra note 17, at 1633 (citing idSchedler, supra.).  The response to 
Schedler’s challenge is not to deny it but to accept it and to move away from the claim that 
institutions of retributive justice, in contrast to deterrence theories, never “use” persons as means 
toward social goals.  Rather, people are not being used as merely means to social goals, to use 
Kant’s more precise language, because a reasonable person would authorize ex ante such 
institutions of criminal justice.  The rules these institutions follow would have to be ones that 
people would authorize not knowing whether they will be offenders, victims, taxpayers, or the 
mistakenly punished.
260
 The assumption here is that if there are more murders, then more social resources are 
expended on investigating, prosecuting, and punishing these crimes.  Assuming the error rate 
stays constant, the more murder cases we try to solve, the more innocent people, in absolute, if 
not relative, terms, are mistakenly punished.
261
 This argument should be relevant even to those who embrace retributivism in a more 
straightforward, deontological manner than I do.
262
 This point is developed nicely in CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, IS CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT MORALLY REQUIRED? THE RELEVANCE OF LIFE-LIFE TRADEOFFS 14 –20 (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center, Working Paper 05-06, 2005) available at http://aei-
brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=922 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). In a separate 
manuscript I explain at greater length how retributivism properly understood accommodates 
most welfarist (deterrence-oriented) critiques through the ex ante institutionalist perspective that 
the CCR affords.  See Markel, Ex Ante Retributivism, supra note 88.   
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convictions decrease in death penalty states compared to those states without the 
death penalty.  The reason is probably related to the supposition that most 
people inclined to consider committing capital crimes are not marginally 
deterred by death as against life imprisonment.  As Professor Marshall observes, 
“any deterrence that criminal penalties are capable of achieving is most 
assuredly accomplished by [the threat of life imprisonment] alone.  Those who 
commit murders despite that threat almost always either (a) believe that they 
will not be identified or (b) do not care at the moment of the murder what might 
happen to them.”263
In addition, were we to countenance execution as a means to reduce 
erroneous convictions, we then invite the risk that innocent individuals would be 
executed, a harm at least as worrisome as false imprisonment in gravity, if not 
frequency.  Perhaps if executions were limited to offenders like Jack (discussed 
above), who confess their culpability (and the evidence independently proves 
that culpability), then executions would seem less problematic.  But there is still 
the persistent dignity argument.  How persuasive would the dignity argument 
become if the punishment that prevented the false accusations were floggings, 
castration, and torture instead of execution?  I leave this as a question because of 
my own sense that, under exigent circumstances or supreme emergencies,264
these atrocities would be morally permitted, even though I can see no institution 
of law fairly requiring this treatment under typical circumstances.
Similar thinking would attach to the concern for the well-being of prison 
guards and inmates who are threatened by an absence of execution.  Earlier I 
adverted to how executions predictably, if not uniformly, cause trauma to prison 
guards, and that such concern was important to retributivism and therefore a 
reason to forbear from executing offenders.  But what if the prison guards’ 
safety would be increased by executions because they would no longer face 
prisoners who are otherwise undeterrable because of prior sentences of lengthy 
or permanent confinement?  Various commentators suggest that it is only the 
threat of death that keeps these convicts from killing prison guards or other 
prisoners.265  Executing these prisoners arguably reduces risks that they will 
murder, rape, or assault others in prison, or outside should they escape (or be 
released early).266  One answer here is that the advent of the supermax security 
prison creates the capability to detain offenders and dramatically reduce if not 
eliminate the corresponding threat to prison guards or other inmates.  In that 
environment, the prisoner can live his entire existence isolated from human 
contact.267
263
 Marshall, supra note 33, at 582.  Marshall is wrong, however, to the extent that certain 
prisoners may require a deterrent threat that is different than the one that has already been visited 
upon them.
264
 On supreme emergencies, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 251 - 268 (1977).
265 See H. A. Bedau, Prison Homicides, Recidivist Murder, and Life Imprisonment, in THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 176 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (citing Norman A. Carlson, 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, who maintained the need for the death penalty in these 
circumstances); Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 445, 450 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997). (“[S]urely the 
death penalty is the only penalty that could deter prisoners already serving a life sentence and 
tempted to kill a guard. . . .”).  As Mary Sigler judiciously points out, “Bedau cites data to 
suggest that, like the deterrence argument more generally, the data do not establish the need for 
the death penalty to prevent prison homicide.”  Sigler, supra note 73, at 1157 n.32 (citing Bedau, 
supra, at 176 - 77). 
266 See Paul G. Cassell, We’re Not Executing the Innocent, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2000, at A14 
(claiming that some 800 murderers who were convicted murdered again after they were 
released).  Of course, in considering this statistic, one must also bear in mind that some number 
of those murderers may not have commited murders that were “death-eligible.”  Bedau, supra
note 122, at 36.  Even so, Cassell’s point is simply that the death penalty is more likely to save 
innocent lives than abolition would, especially since abolitionists have not successfully shown 
that factually innocent people have been executed, even though there have been some credible 
close calls.  Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH 
PENALTY, supra note 122, at 183, 206 - 08.   
267 See Marshall, supra note 33, at 581.  I assume that life in these prisons can be improved. At 
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That said, I recognize that the well-being and security of prison guards 
and inmates is a concern intrinsic to the CCR project, and that it too should be 
weighed against the preceding (and, to my mind, more overwhelming) 
arguments against the death penalty already adumbrated.
Does the logic of my argument require me to acknowledge that the state 
must consider the further costs and consequences of its inaction, its choice not to 
execute?  If it turned out that not executing someone predictably led to hundreds 
of innocent lives being lost, couldn’t a fair-minded critic state that, on my 
account, the retributivist social planner has no more reason to privilege the 
wrongfully executed innocent life than the innocent life snuffed out by a murder 
that could have been prevented or deterred by the state?268
I think the answer here is no, and this may also partially address the 
problem of prison guard safety, but not entirely.  It is reasonable to insist that 
there is a difference between the possibility of an innocent life being taken by 
some unknown future offender and the possibility of an innocent life being taken 
by the state.  The significance is that the state acts in all our names, whereas the 
undeterred future offender’s guilt is personal to her.  Some people may 
reasonably wish to preserve their integrity by not sharing in the responsibility 
that arises when the state kills an innocent person, even if it means that on 
balance they increase the risk that their own lives are endangered by a failure to 
deter.
Personally, I am reluctant to accept this integrity-based argument, at least 
at the level of the state.  That’s because ex ante one might value one’s life or the 
lives of one’s children over partial encroachments upon one’s integrity if there 
were conclusive proof that deterrence would be achieved, because the line 
between actual and statistical lives disappears under a veil of ignorance, where 
we are all statistical lives.269  In other words, we are all statistical lives ex ante, 
and if there is compelling evidence that innocent life can be saved, we do well to 
consider that evidence alongside our fears of any risk of error or abuse that the 
state may make when we determine the proper trade-off. 
Thus, with respect to the task of saving innocent lives (aside from the 
erroneously executed), it seems to me that there is no retributivist argument 
available in favor of executions.  That does not mean there could never be a 
reason to undertake an execution for the purpose of saving innocent lives.  It just 
means we should not call that execution “punishment.”  And so long as we are 
trading some innocent lives now for more innocent lives later, we should note 
that the deterrence argument (for the purpose of saving lives) does not and need 
not conceptually presuppose any effort to make sure we execute a guilty 
offender.  It is simply a risk regulation problem, in the same way that 
immunizations, air-bag regulations, and conscripted armies are.270  But whereas 
with those examples, we can say with substantial certainty that we will save 
lives, we have no information leading us to believe that we will do so in the 
death penalty context of deterrence arguments.
To summarize this point, opting for execution as a measure to reduce 
erroneous convictions would theoretically be permissible as a retributivist 
present, reasonable challenges to conditions of confinement are regularly issued against these so-
called “prisons of the future.”  See generally Robert M. Ferrier, Note, “An Atypical and 
Significant Hardship:” The Supermax Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on 
Status—A Plea for Procedural Due Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 293 - 96, n.27 - 28 (2004) 
(providing background on supermaxes and citations to litigation involving supermax prisons).
268
 Just before this paper went to the publisher, Sunstein and Vermeule’s paper, supra note 262, 
became available, and raised this precise issue.
269 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 - 23 (rev. ed. 1999).  The literature on veils of 
ignorance rules is helpfully discussed in Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in 
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L. J. 399, 399 - 401 (2001).
270
 There is a vast literature on risk regulation and risk-risk tradeoffs.  For a good introduction, 
see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2002).  As I 
mentioned earlier, supra note 268, Sunstein and Vermeule develop the relevance of the life-life 
tradeoff into an argument in support of the thesis that capital punishment is morally required.  
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consideration, assuming the empirics could make conclusive sense, although it 
would be balanced against the other retributivist anti-death penalty arguments 
advanced thus far.  This is because the CCR only gives reasons to punish the 
guilty, not the innocent.   However, executions occurring for the purpose of 
saving innocent lives would not be permitted under a retributivist framework 
because no account of retribution purports to justify punishment for that 
purpose.  That is not to say saving lives could not be used to justify an execution 
(even of an innocent); it merely means that we should not call that execution 
“punishment.”  At that point, we are interested in saving innocent lives and 
society frequently requires the sacrifice of some innocent lives for the 
preservation of many when there is conclusive evidence that this will be the net 
effect.  
While the deterrence concerns are good theoretical arguments (and I 
recognize that some retributivists may not be willing to countenance these 
concerns because they are prospective in nature,) I believe these concerns 
ultimately pose a limited challenge.  First, as I highlighted above, there is no 
conclusive data proving that the death penalty is an effective deterrent.271  Some 
studies indicate that the homicide rates are higher in death penalty states.272
New scholarship has tried to emerge with pristine conclusions to the contrary,273
but with little apparent success.274  As an empirical matter, prosecutors may be 
correct when they state that the energy and time spent on death penalty cases 
draw scarce resources away from the prosecutions of other serious crimes, 
which also threaten the security of innocent persons.275  Indeed, some scholars 
271 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 302 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no 
reason to believe that . . . the punishment of death is necessary to deter the commission of capital 
crimes.”); NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, 
AND GUIDELINES 53 (2004) (“Though long debated and frequently studied, the fundamentally 
important empirical question of whether the death penalty deters remains unresolved.”); William 
C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the 
Literature, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 265, at 135, 154 (arguing that the 
evidence does not support the contention that capital punishment is an effective deterrent).  
Sigler, however, notes the complexity of these conclusions from a methodological standpoint: 
A simple comparison of murder rates before and after an execution (or a series 
of them) cannot control for the multitude of variables that affect a murderer’s 
decision/impulse to kill. Further, the slow and uncertain process of 
apprehending, convicting, and executing an offender . . .  presumably blunts 
whatever deterrent effect a more efficient system might deliver. Finally, it is 
not clear, as a practical matter, that it would ever be possible to measure 
potential offenders’ reasons, including the threat of capital punishment, for 
their failure to kill. What population sample would this include? How are 
deterred murderers to be identified? Moreover, despite the familiar anti-death 
penalty argument that an individual is not likely to be thinking in terms of the 
relative severity of punishments at the time he commits murder, one who 
grows up in a society that consistently imposes severe penalties for criminal 
wrongdoing may be more likely to internalize a fear of harsh pun ishment and 
be deterred from offending. Deterrent effects may thus be subtler than critics 
have supposed.
Sigler, supra note 73, at 1158 n.37.
272 See Raymond Bonner & Ford Fessenden, States With No Death Penalty Share Lower 
Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at A1 (describing study).
273
 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 262 (citing Hashem Dezhbakhsh, et al. Does Capital 
Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Post-moratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. 
L. & EC. REV. 344 (2003)).
274 See Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Déjà Vu All Over 
Again?, J. EMP. L. STUD. (forthcoming 2005), available at
http://preprints.stat.ucla.edu/396/JELS.pap.pdf (casting doubt on the studies of the 
econometricians who have been urging the death penalty’s deterrent effect); Ted Goertzel, 
Capital Punishment and Homicide: Sociological Realities and Econometric Illusions: Does 
Executing Murderers Cut the Homicide Rate or Not?, SKEPTICAL INQUIRER, July - August 2004, 
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2843/is_4_28/ai_n6145278/pg_1.
275 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (discussing Robert Morgenthau’s policy as Manhattan District Attorney to avoid 
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have found that murder rates go up in states after the authorization of the death 
penalty, either because of a general brutalizing effect on the polity, or because of 
the added incentive for offenders to kill all possible witnesses to cover up their 
crimes to avoid execution.276
In sum, it appears that good and sufficient reasons exist for retributivists 
to counsel against the death penalty (at the very least provisionally) in light of 
the lack of good information, the human costs of attaining better information 
through controlled experiments, and the normatively unattractive conceptual 
difficulties highlighted earlier. 
2. Retribution, Moral Desert and Death 
Not so fast though.  We must also ask what, if any, good and sufficient 
retributivist reasons stand in favor of the death penalty.  Putting aside the 
speculative empirical reasons discussed above that have a tangential relation to 
retributivism, i.e., that capital punishment may prevent fewer innocent people 
from being wrongfully convicted, I cannot deny that various people believe that 
some crimes are so bad that the offenders deserve to die and that the execution 
of these people is proportionate to the heinousness of their crimes.277  But what 
is the reasoned basis for this belief and what makes that reasoned basis a 
retributivist basis?
Let us suppose that some offender commits truly wicked crimes.  
Retributivism’s commitment to setting the severity of punishment according to 
the severity of the crime would require that this offender receive the most severe 
punishment the state imposes.  But nothing intrinsic to retributivism says that 
the most severe punishment the state must impose is the death penalty.  Indeed, 
if we thought of the most severe punishments we could imagine, they might 
have to do with extended periods of immiseration and torture, or the forced 
spectacle of watching one’s loved ones be immiserated and tortured for 
extended periods of time.  Nothing about the retributivist answer to why we 
punish requires that the death penalty be one of the options in how much we 
punish.278
The reason people think retributivism requires execution of murderers is 
because of the confusion that associates retribution’s proportionality principle--
that severe crimes be punished severely-- with the separate notion of lex 
seeking the death penalty), reh’g en banc granted by 382 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2004).  In fact, 
Morgenthau authored an op-ed declaring that the death penalty “actually hinders the fight 
against crime” because it is time-consuming and expensive.  Robert M. Morgenthau, What 
Prosecutors Won’t Tell You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1995, at A25; see also E. Michael McCann, 
Opposing Capital Punishment: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 649 (1996) 
(elaborating upon prosecutors’ aversion to the high costs of seeking the death penalty).  
According to some estimates, the “average cost per execution in the United States ranges from 
$2 million to $3 million.”  Wallace, supra note 1, at 396.
276 See CLAIRE FINKELSTEIN, AN A PRIORI ARGUMENT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 9 (Univ. 
of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 15, 2002) (finding 
that on average homicides increased after executions) (citing WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL 
HOMICIDE 106 - 14 (1984)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=347323.
277 See, e.g., BERNS, supra note 27; Blecker, supra note 144, at B1 (“I believe that some people 
kill so viciously, with an attitude so callous or cruel, that they deserve to die--and society has an 
obligation to execute them.”); Pearl, supra note 72, at 301 (“The death penalty has always been 
considered a standard example of retributive justice; there is no other punishment that can be 
inflicted on a murderer that could possibly be proportionate to his crime.”) (citation omitted); 
Wallace, supra note 1. 
278
 Though the concession seems to me to be of little significance, I readily note that 
retributivism cannot determine which range of punishments is commensurate with a given 
offense. Retributivism, after all, need not purport to be a comprehensive theory of criminal 
justice, and thus should not be expected to dictate whether driving under the influence should be 
penalized by a sentence of a suspended driver’s license or twenty years imprisonment.  
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talionis.279  Lex talionis is not itself a justification for institutions of punishment 
nor does it provide a basis for understanding why someone should be punished 
“in-kind.” 280  It is merely a notion that says someone should suffer in a way that 
mirrors the suffering that person imposed on another person.281  To the extent it 
is a principle, it is a principle that imposes a limit or ceiling on the severity of 
punishment.282  In any case, one need not be a retributivist to embrace lex 
talionis, and an embrace of retributivism need not entail a commitment to lex 
talionis.283
Moreover, even if lex talionis were necessarily conjoined to 
retributivism, it does not follow that execution is the only way of “repaying” a 
murderer.284  As Jeremy Waldron has written, “a defense of LT [lex talionis] 
(even for murderers) is consistent with a rejection of capital punishment in cases 
of homicide.”285  On this view, murder is wrong not because it ends life as such, 
but because it involves the intentional and radical disruption of an “autonomous 
life.  Very well, then let us radically disrupt the autonomous life of the offender.  
Does this mean we have to kill him?  It depends on whether or not we have 
available some other punishment that shares this abstract feature with acts of 
killing.”286
Furthermore, even if an offender may morally deserve death for his 
279
 That retributivists endorse a principle of proportionality between crime and punishment does 
not require the conclusion that what was once a crime is always a crime or that what was once a 
fitting punishment will immutably remain a fitting punishment.  These decisions have their own 
social meaning to be mediated through the legislatures of the particular society, and the 
retributivist should support these decisions so long as they fall broadly within liberal parameters.  
See Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, supra note 16, at 2206 - 09.
280
 The problems with lex are well-known: in addition to the fact that it may require the state’s 
agents to undertake morally odious actions, and that it cannot be applied where the harm or 
victim is diffuse, e.g., counterfeiting or tax fraud, lex cannot be applied in a manner that easily 
takes into account varying mens rea, even though the kind of mens rea is part of the basic 
analysis of culpability.  See Shafer-Landau, supra note 87, at 193. But see Waldron, supra note 
21 (trying to overcome these difficulties).
281 See Shafer-Landau, supra note 17, at 299. But as Waldron notes, even as strict an adherent to 
lex talionis as Kant rejected punishments strictly in kind for crimes like rape or bestiality.  
Waldron, supra note 21, at 38 n.27.  As Kant wrote:
But how can this principle be applied to punishments that do not allow 
reciprocation because they are either impossible in themselves or would 
themselves be punishable crimes against humanity in general. Rape, pederasty, 
and bestiality are examples of the latter. For rape and pederasty, [the 
punishment is] castration (after the manner of either a white or a black eunuch 
in the sultan’s seraglio), and for bestiality [expulsion forever from human 
society, because the individual has made himself unworthy of human 
relations.] Per quod quis peccat, per idem punitur et idem.
Id. (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 132 (John Ladd trans., 
1965)) (alterations in original). 
282
 This has always been the traditional Jewish understanding of the “eye for an eye” language in 
the Torah.  See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musing on 
“Eye for Eye” and the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 510 - 15 (explaining why the 
biblical verse “eye for eye” does not reflect lex talionis).  Indeed, notwithstanding the various 
capital offenses mentioned in the Torah, there was an incredible reluctance among the rabbinic 
sages to mete out the death penalty, and many impediments to its imposition were devised.  See
Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God’s Mercy and the Four Biblical Methods 
of Capital Punishment, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1180 - 82 (2004) (discussing the obstacles to a 
capital conviction under Jewish law).
283 See Waldron, supra note 21, at 25 (“[S]ince LT is a principle about what counts as an 
appropriate punishment, it is compatible with a variety of theories about the point or justification 
of punishment, including utilitarian theories.”).
284
 I place “repaying” in quotes because my theory of retribution does not view the offender’s 
wrong as a debt he has incurred that he must pay back.  This metaphor is inaccurate for a host of 
reasons.  See Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, supra note 16, at 2214 
n.255.
285
 Waldron, supra note 21, at 25.
286 Id. at 42.  Waldron’s argument only shows that LT does not require the death penalty for 
murders; it does not show that LT precludes the death penalty for murders.
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actions, it does not follow that the state should be the one inflicting death on him 
for the same reasons that it would be wrong for the state to torture a sadistic 
torturer.  We could be wrong about the identity of the offender, it requires 
immodesty, it traumatizes the souls of the punishing agents of the state, and it 
offends dignity.287  In addition, death forecloses the opportunity to internalize 
the ideals animating retribution.  To be sure, some crimes are heinous, and 
severe punishment is warranted for those crimes, and the CCR explains why that 
is so.  But justice prohibits the execution of an offender when other forms of 
punishment are available to communicate to the offender (and the polity) the 
very norms that give rise to the project of retributive justice.288
For a retributivist to insist upon capital punishment is to move away 
from the question of why punishment is justified to the questions of how much 
punishment is deserved and how much punishment the state should impose.  
This move can only be made, I submit, if the retributivist can point to how the 
particular punishment is consistent with the underlying justification of the 
retributivist account of punishment.  Under the CCR, there is a capacious range 
of punishments that a state may impose after democratic and reasoned 
deliberation, but the death penalty falls out of that range for the reasons 
articulated earlier.289
Will the overarching argument throughout this article sway inveterate 
believers in the death penalty?  My naïve and audacious hope is that it will.  But 
less naïve and less audacious is the hope that these arguments will at least make 
the arguments of each side in this debate more nuanced.  And even if these 
arguments cannot persuade the universal adoption of an abolitionist perspective 
on the death penalty, they can at least furnish a solid foundation to those who 
use their constitutional powers to extend blanket commutations in the name of 
justice.
CONCLUSION
In the course of deflecting criticism of Ryan’s actions--that Ryan abused 
his power, improperly relied upon mercy, and disregarded the interests of 
victims and the desert of offenders--several arguments against the death penalty 
(some contingent and some conceptual) emerged.
I began with the narrow question of whether Ryan’s blanket 
commutation was permissible on retributivist grounds, focusing in particular on 
the serious concern that the reliability and accuracy of the criminal justice 
system, in particular in cases where the penalties are most severe, remain in 
287
 While some of these criticisms might be made about locking a dangerous offender up in a 
prison, these problems are not irrevocable and irremediable.  Ex ante, we would authorize the 
state to act decisively against offenders, even though it must also develop procedures to reduce 
and correct errors.
288
 In this respect, one sees that my account of justice goes beyond a simple principle of 
enforcing all bargains.  A theorist like van den Haag states that there is no injustice in visiting 
upon an offender a punishment he knows he may face as a result of his crime.  See van den 
Haag, supra note 72, at 1668 (“[T]he criminal volunteered to assume the risk of receiving a legal 
punishment that he could have avoided by not committing the crime.  The punishment he suffers 
is the punishment he voluntarily risked suffering and, therefore, it is no more unjust to him than 
any other event for which one knowingly volunteers to assume the risk.”).  On this view, 
execution for overtime parking is permissible so long as the offender was on notice of the 
punishment.  Van den Haag’s position strips away the notion that retributive justice requires a 
matching of severity between crime and punishment—unless overtime parking were deemed the 
most serious offense on the books by a society.   
289
 The broad range of punishment choices may seem noxious to some, like Shafer-Landau, 
supra note 17, who want to see retributivism provide determinate, or at least more guided, 
sentencing options.  I think that asks too much of retributivism since it need not purport to be a 
comprehensive theory of criminal justice in order for it to explain why we punish offenders for 
the past legal wrongdoing for which they are responsible, and why that punishment must suffice 
as a credible repudiation of the claims of false value made by the offender’s action. 
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question.  Related to this problem of inaccuracy is the system’s freakish 
imposition of the death penalty, under which arbitrary factors, such as intra-state 
geography and the race of victim, play a heightened and unjustified role.290
After explaining why it would be virtually impossible to ameliorate these 
problems through case-by-case review without leaving lingering doubts or 
creating new problems, I considered various other objections one could make in 
the name of the CCR to the larger question of the death penalty itself.  I 
explained the CCR’s underlying maxim, the notion that we require persons to 
bear responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions.  
In the context of the death penalty, this means the polity cannot disclaim its 
responsibility for the trauma that predictably arises among the tie-down teams of 
executions, nor can it blithely disregard the frequency of botched executions that 
wreak unbearable pain on the body of the offender.  However, I acknowledged 
that some of these concerns could dissipate over time with improvements in the 
criminal justice system.  Thus, I began to explore three related conceptual 
arguments.  
The first argued that the state has an obligation to preserve, to the extent 
possible, an opportunity for the offender to internalize the correct values that 
underlie the confrontational encounter between the state and him.  The 
implication is that the internal intelligibility of the practice of retribution would 
be ruptured if the punishments carried out in its name did not permit an 
opportunity for the message of the punishment to take.  
The second argument posits that the state’s execution of an offender 
requires an immodest posture of overweening confidence that is improper for a 
state to exhibit.  This requirement of modesty in punishment arises in 
conjunction with the concern about accuracy and innocence.  The anxiety about 
punishing or executing the wrong person means that the state must leave itself 
avenues in which it can undertake its own reparations and apologies to persons it 
has mistakenly punished.  The hubris and finality associated with an execution 
forecloses the state’s opportunity to take those steps toward rectifying the 
injustice it has caused.  
Finally, I appealed to the notion that embedded within the CCR is a 
commitment to respecting the dignity of every person, a dignity we affirm by 
punishing offenders for the consequences of their freely chosen and autonomous 
actions.  Such respect for human dignity entails obligations to the offender as 
well as to ourselves, and among those is the obligation not to punish in a way 
that erodes human dignity.  Capital punishment degrades dignity, on this view, 
because it unnecessarily extinguishes human life in the presence of viable 
alternatives.    
Taken together, these reasons counsel in favor not only of a blanket 
commutation, but also the abolition of the death penalty itself.  Nonetheless, 
there are countervailing concerns that make the argument more complex and 
polyphonic.  First, I considered those consequentialist reasons for the death 
penalty that resonate within the CCR’s framework.  The most pressing concerns 
I identified were the possibilities (although they seem entirely speculative on the 
evidence currently available) that the marginal deterrent threat of execution 
could conceivably reduce the number of false convictions, as well as the number 
of prison guards (or inmates) injured or killed by other offenders.  These 
concerns, however, do not remove or reduce the risk of wrongful executions.  
I also explained why the retributivist framework tolerates no argument in 
favor of the death penalty for the purpose of saving innocent lives.  That goal, I 
said, should be treated like any risk-risk tradeoff that the modern administrative 
state undertakes when it risks trading some innocent lives for the purpose of 
saving more innocent lives.  At the point that saving future lives becomes the 
290 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death 
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual.”).
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justification for executions, however, we should cease to call that practice 
“punishment” since there is no conceptual need for legal guilt to be the trigger 
for the execution.  
Finally, I considered the difficulty of asserting a connection between 
moral desert and the state’s execution of murderers.  I found no inherent reason 
for supposing that retributivists should support the death penalty for any 
particular crime, including the “worst of the worst” crimes.
* * *
Demonstrating why Governor Ryan’s blanket commutation is not 
morally disastrous from a devout retributivist’s perspective serves important 
purposes beyond achieving conceptual clarity.  It illustrates the availability of a 
discourse in opposition to the death penalty that is also politically salient in 
these times of “harsh justice.”291  Retributivism, understood as the CCR, 
furnishes a discourse that, in its commitment to moral accountability and equal 
liberty, resonates broadly within our public political culture, but it is also a 
discourse that hinges upon modesty in modes of punishment and dignity in 
motivation and effect.  In that respect, such arguments are capable of opposing 
the apparently ineluctable slide towards ever-harsher punishments in the name 
of criminal justice.  To realize that potential, however, we must reappropriate 
the language of retribution from those who have hijacked it in the name of 
making offenders suffer endlessly.292  I do not doubt that savvy politicians can 
do so by deploying a rhetoric of responsibility that speaks in both individual and 
collective terms.293
       To go down that path in the context of the death penalty, however, requires 
that we not recoil from the implications of the underlying thesis beyond the 
realm of capital punishment.  Though the task of elaborating that point in great 
detail is better left for another day, it should be clear that the argument offered 
here signals that, far from being indifferent to the interests of offenders, 
retributivism is sensitive to, and indeed obsessed with, concerns of equity, 
accuracy, and moral dignity in criminal justice.294  Thus, a commitment to 
291 WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 17.
292
 The denunciation of retributivist defenses of punishment often occurs in the name of 
denunciating “harsh justice.”  See WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE, supra note 17; Whitman, A Plea 
Against Retributivism, supra note 17; Dolinko, supra note 17, at 1650 (stating that retributivists 
use language like “respect for persons” to “cloak[] a desire to inflict suffering on criminals with 
a clear conscience and a minimum of concern with their background and capacities”).
293
 For example, the goal of achieving impartiality through an ex ante perspective can be 
imperfectly translated into colloquial political discourse by adopting a tone of personal decision-
making.  That is, in contemplating the death penalty, politicians in favor of abolition can ask: 
What if that alleged offender is my child or my sister?  Has the process of guilt determination 
been one I could support with unflinching steadfastness?  Could I ask my child or my sister to 
stand in the shoes of the executioner?  Could I believe that my child or my sister who may have 
committed an unspeakable crime is so bereft of human dignity that her bare presence alone in a 
prison is an assault on our shared conceptions of justice?  These questions bring home the notion 
of being responsible as individuals, on our own behalf and for each other.  This set of tropes 
helps render attractive and compatible the complex relationship among responsibility, 
retribution, modesty and dignity.
294
 The problems of inaccuracy and maldistribution of punishment revealed by study of the death 
penalty no doubt also beleaguer the system by which we mete out non-capital punishment.  
Moreover, alternatives to incarceration--such as shaming punishments--that aim at the 
degradation of offenders are improper because they involve the same immodesty, sanctimony, 
and assault on dignity that are improperly associated with the killing state.  See Markel, Are 
Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?, supra note 16.   What’s more, to occlude those 
degradations by simply placing them out of the public eye and in the prison system is obviously 
no satisfactory response.  Our prisons are too often teeming and fetid pestholes and we rely on 
prisons as our solution for too many crimes, too many people, and too much time.  See, e.g., 
ABA JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION ON PRISON CONDITIONS AND 
PRISONER REENTRY (2004), available at http://www.abanews.org/kencomm/rep121d.pdf; ABA 
JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATION ON PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND 
SENTENCING (2004), available at http://www.abanews.org/kencomm/rep121a.pdf.  Nonetheless, 
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retributive punishment impedes neither the realization of humane institutions of 
criminal justice nor a revolt against the benighted, misbegotten, and often brutal 
status quo we continue to tolerate to our shame. 
prisons are an important part of the punitive archipelago and we need to find ways that make the 
experiences of offenders within prisons more conducive to the possibility that the values 
animating retributive justice can be effectively communicated to, and internalized by, offenders.  
Boot camps, mandatory drug treatment, guilt punishments, and fundamentally decent prisons are 
not beyond our ken.
